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ABSTRACT 
This study explores HA/DR operations and the associated response of the international 
community during the recent earthquake in Haiti and flood in Pakistan in 2010.  A 
powerful earthquake of magnitude 7.0 hit Haiti on January 12, causing great damage and 
mass casualties.  The international community responded swiftly and took over relief 
efforts in the country saving a lot of lives. Handsome donations were also given and 
committed.  Pakistan suffered heavy floods that started in the end of July 2010 and 
affected nearly the entire country.  Loss of life was not very great, but infrastructure 
damage and people subsequently affected surpassed the combined total of the 2004 
Tsunami, Haiti earthquake and 2005 South Asia earthquake. During this disaster the 
international community, particularly volunteer technologists, were not mobilized the 
way they were in Haiti. Donations were made late and comparatively slow. No single 
country can handle a large-scale natural disaster like the two exemplar cases chosen for 
this thesis, and hence the role of the international community is very important.  Such 
response has not been equitable in the past and it is the goal of this research to find ways 
to make it more equitable in the future. 
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Hazards such as flood, cyclone and earthquake are natural.  But disasters 
are not natural: they claim the highest mortality and impose the harshest 
cost on the poorest nations.1 
A. FOREWORD 
As per the International Disaster Database, there has been a steady increase in the 
frequency of natural disasters during past thirty five years, with almost as many occurring 
in past five years as in the whole of the previous decade. Average disasters per year 
between 1994 and 1998 were 428, which jumped to the annual average of 707 between 
1999 and 2003.  
 
Figure 1.   Natural Disasters Reported from 1975 to 20082 
                                                 
1 “Disasters and development: After the floods,” editorial, no author, The Guardian, 23 August 2010. 




This increasing trend is shown in most categories of disasters, including 
hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes.  People in the poorest countries are the most affected 
due to poor housing quality, inadequate levels of infrastructure and weak emergency 
services.3 
In 2010, the world suffered many natural disasters, but two among these may be 
considered among the worst in the history of mankind due to either lives lost or 
population affected. As soon the year started, a great earthquake of magnitude 7.0 hit 
Haiti at 04:53:10 PM on January 12, 2010; its epicenter was 25 km (8.1 miles) from Port 
Au Prince, the capital city of Haiti.4 The earthquake killed more than 230,000 people, 
injured hundreds of thousands more, and the country suffered great infrastructure loss. 
The government also lost thousands of its civil servants and was in a very difficult 
situation for conducting relief operations as well as other business of the governance. The 
government was already facing difficulties with the issues of security and poor economic 
conditions and it was not possible for it to conduct the relief efforts with its own 
resources.  However, after the earthquake, the international community responded swiftly 
and hundreds of relief workers reached the country to help in rescue operations, and 
thousands of tons of relief goods were received.  Donations in the form of cash were also 
significant from countries, as well as from the public sector of different nations, 
particularly from U.S. citizens.  During this disaster a new volunteer group of information 
and communication technologists emerged, which played a great role in relief operations.  
In the later part of the year, Pakistan was struck by the worst flood in its history.  
The flooding began on July 29, 2010 due to heavy rains and snow melting in the northern 
part of the country.5 The flood first hit the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, which 
is the northern part of the country, and killed around 1,156 people (the most in any 
                                                 
3 Diane Coyle and Patrick Meler, “New Technologies in Emergencies and Conflicts: The Role of 
Information and Social Networks,” Accessed 31 March 2011.  Available http://www.globalproblems-
globalsolutions-files.org/pdf/UNF_tech/emergency_tech_report2009/Tech_EmergencyTechReport_full.pdf 
p.4.  
4 USGS, No Author. Accessed 24 March 2011. Available 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/recenteqsww/Quakes/us2010rja6.php. 
5 U.S. Department of State, “Update: U.S. Response to Pakistan’s Flooding Disaster,” No Author, 
August 9, 2010. Accessed 5 January 2011. Available http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/08/145814.htm. 
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province) and injured around 1,198 more.6 As the water kept moving south, rivers 
overflowed their banks and flooded thousands of villages, towns and dozens of cities and 
caused further casualties, injuries and great infrastructure damages such as bridges, roads, 
hospitals, government buildings and houses, etc. More than two million people became 
homeless, hundreds of thousands of livestock were killed, whole crops for the season 
were swept away, and more than one fifth of the country was submerged. This situation 
added to the miseries of the country, which was already struggling due to militancy and 
poor economic conditions. A disaster of this size and scope clearly required the support 
of the international community to provide humanitarian relief. 
Comparisons between the international community’s response to the Haitian 
earthquake and to Pakistan’s floods can perhaps provide grounds for comparing and 
analyzing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) efforts as these major 
tragedies occurred within seven months of each other. The main focus of this study is to 
identify and explore possible reasons for the disproportionate response from the 
international community to the two disasters. Although these are different types of 
disasters, there are some similarities and differences between the two cases that deserve 
attention. 
B. COMPARING EARTHQUAKES AND FLOODS 
Between the years 2000 and 2009, around two billion people were affected by 
disasters throughout the world. Out of those, 44% were affected by floods, 30% by 
drought, and only 4% by earthquakes. However, 60% of those killed in disasters died in 
earthquakes. In comparison with flooding, earthquakes pose particular difficulties:7 
• Risk of aftershocks following a major earthquake traumatizes population, 
poses threat to the life of relief workers and complicates relief efforts. 
                                                 
6 NDMA Pakistan, “Pakistan Floods-Summary of Damages,” No Author. Accessed 24 March 2011. 
Available http://www.pakistanfloods.pk/en/damage/summary-of-damages/damages. 
7 Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), 
“Responding to earthquakes 2008 - Learning from earthquake relief and recovery operations,” No Author. 
July 2008. Accessed 24 March 2011. Available 
http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/ALNAPLessonsEarthquakes.pdf.  
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• Earthquake leads to damaged infrastructure, collapsed buildings and large 
amounts of rubble, which need to be moved for relief efforts. 
• Large numbers of injuries in contrast to flooding where people either die 
by drowning or escape largely unscathed.  Earthquake injuries tend to be 
particularly serious such as spinal cord injuries, crushed limbs that require 
both immediate care and longer term rehabilitation. 
• Difficulties in mobilizing support to reduce future risks, as earthquakes are 
less likely to occur than other disasters. 
• The effects in case of a major earthquake are generally concentrated as 
compared to other natural disasters, such as floods, which normally cover 
a huge area.  
• Collapsing buildings may kill large numbers of people, whereas in case of 
floods or other disasters due to early warning people may be evacuated 
and casualties may be reduced. Thus, earthquakes cause high mortality 
than other disasters. 
• Earthquakes pose low risk of epidemics whereas outbreak of an epidemic 
especially cholera and diarrhea following a flood is generally more 
common. 
• There is no gap or stability phase between relief and recovery as 
earthquake may hit with refugee emergencies or similar complex 
emergencies. Households begin their recovery efforts immediately after 
the earthquake. 
Most obviously, earthquakes occur suddenly and with little or no warning. People 
cannot be evacuated in advance of an earthquake and efforts to mitigate the risks of 
earthquakes generally focus on making buildings safer by implementing strict building 
code and educating the population on how to respond when the tremor strikes; both of 
these measures need preparation far in advance before the tremor actually struck.  In 




of a dam, large scale flooding is usually the result of sustained heavy rains over a period 
of time, which causes rivers to swell and overflow their banks.  This is what happened in 
Pakistan.8 
Earthquakes can occur in rural as well as urban areas, but the damage is greater in 
urban areas because of greater number and large size of the buildings, which can 
collapse, and also because of the concentration of the population. Flooding caused due to 
heavy rains is often paralleled by mudslides. Large scale flooding tends to have more of 
an impact on agriculture and livestock than major earthquakes. Major earthquakes 
certainly disrupt agricultural production by damaging transportation and economic 
infrastructures.  Flooding can destroy crops as well as equipment and seeds.  Even when 
flood waters subside, the land may be unfit for agricultural production for a long period 
of time.  Livestock is a particularly valued resource in rural communities and livestock is 
almost always lost when there is major flooding.9 
Following an earthquake or wide scale flooding, different resources are needed to 
rescue people from imminent danger. In case of earthquakes, the immediate challenge is 
to find survivors buried under rubble, while in large scale flooding the need is to evacuate 
people from rooftops, trees, and other places that provide protection from the rising 
water. Earthquakes require heavy equipment to remove debris and conduct search and 
rescue work, while flooding requires helicopters and boats to evacuate people and 
provide relief goods to stranded people. In a major disaster the capacity of national 
authorities to meet these needs is overwhelmed and therefore equipment and specialized 
teams must be brought in from outside the country, which always takes a lot of time.  In 
the Haitian earthquake, most of the people pulled alive from the rubble were rescued by 
family, neighbors and the community. By the time the international community reached 
for help (sixty seven search and rescue teams) and in spite of their heroic efforts, the lives 
                                                 




9 Ibid.  
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saved numbered only 132.10 Even in the case of Pakistan, many of those who escaped the 
flooding did so at their own without transport or support from either the Pakistani 
authorities or the international community.  
Access by humanitarian workers to people in need is almost always a difficult 
issue in natural disaster response because of the damaged transportation infrastructure.  In 
both Haiti and Pakistan, access has been slow.  In Haiti this was largely because of huge 
amount of rubble and the destruction of roads; in Pakistan it was primarily because much 
of countryside was underwater and roads and bridges were washed out. At a time when 
people need food and water, there simply isn’t time to rebuild the infrastructure to 
facilitate the movement of equipment and supplies.11 
In all major disasters affected communities not only have material needs for life 
saving assistance (food, water, water and sanitation, shelter, medical care), but also often 
face protection or security needs. In the case of Haiti, the problems of separated children, 
human trafficking, sexual and gender based violence and overall violence in the camps 
continued to be serious issues even seven months after the earthquake. Pakistan was 
faced with the issue of separated children, discrimination by caste in provision of 
assistance, and of gender based violence.12 Table 1 shows a comparison of deaths, 
injuries and damages caused by some of the important natural disasters in the recent 
past.13 
                                                 
10 USA Today, “U.N.: Haiti calls off search and rescue,” No Author, Staff and Wire reports, 23 
January 2010. Accessed 24 March 2011. Available http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-01-23-
haiti-saturday_N.htm. 
11 Ferris, “Earthquakes and Floods.”  
12 Ibid. 
13 NDMA Pakistan, “Important Disasters- Comparative Statement,” No Author. Accessed 27 March 
2011. Available http://www.ndma.gov.pk/Documents/flood_2010/flood_comparison.pdf. 
 7
 
*Information based on initial assessment 
Table 1.   Important Disasters—Comparative Statement 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The research involves a comparative analysis of the Haiti earthquake and the 
Pakistan floods that occurred in 2010.  The variables for comparative analysis of 
emergency response operations by the international community were selected and each 
variable was assigned a weighting score ‘N’ according to its influence and significance 
on the response by the international community to a major disaster. The effect of each 
variable on the response shown by the international community in our two exemplar 
cases (i.e., earthquake in Haiti and floods in Pakistan in 2010) was determined.  The 
country, which had better response by the international community under the influence of 
a particular variable will be assigned the value ‘N+N/2’ and the other ‘N-N/2.’ The 
values assigned to each variable for both the countries will be used to determine the 
cumulative response by the international community in each country, which will lead to a 
determination as to whether the response in both the exemplar cases was equitable or not. 
If not, the reasons for this difference are explored.  Recommendations to improve the 
international community’s response to major disasters and to make it equitable for all 
nations are provided. 
The following variables are used for comparative analysis of response shown by 
the international community in our two exemplar cases: 
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1. Pre-existing Conditions in the Country: 
a. Overall political and economic conditions 
b. State of the military forces or trained human resources 
available for rescue and relief works 
c. Geographical location and level of engagement with the 
international community 
2. Media Attention 
3. Nature of the disaster 
4. Temporal factor 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this comparative study will be to analyze the difference in the nature 
of response from the international community in the cases of the Haiti earthquake and 
Pakistan’s flood that occurred in 2010.  Both countries are very different in nature and 
location, and the nature of the disaster was also different in each case, but the response 
from the international community in both situations provide sufficient grounds for 
comparative analyses given the large degree of commonality for HA/DR operations in 
general. 
E. PURPOSE 
The outcome of this study will help to improve the disaster response of the 
international community by determining ways for more equitably provided disaster relief 
that is good for the international community. 
F. THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis is divided into six chapters.  Chapter I introduces the subject, defines 
the structure of this thesis, the methodology that will be employed, and exact scope and 
purpose of the thesis. Chapter II will explain the nature of the disaster of the earthquake 
in Haiti in 2010 and will present the facts of the event and the response from within the 
country and the international community. This chapter will also shed some light on 
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hurricane Tomas, which hit Haiti in 2010 and the nature of response by the international 
community to that event. This chapter will also introduce the modern tools that were used 
by relief organizations during the earthquake relief operations. Chapter III will explain 
the facts and historical background of the floods in Pakistan in 2010 and will also 
highlight the nature of response shown from within the country and by the international 
community.  The 2005 earthquake in Pakistan will also be discussed in terms of its nature 
of damage and nature of response it received from within the country and from the 
international community.  This chapter will also introduce what modern tools were used 
by relief organizations during the flood relief operations in 2010.  Chapter IV will explain 
the variables selected for comparative analyses and why they were chosen. Chapter V 
will discuss the state of each variable in both the disasters and will determine the value of 
each variable for comparative analyses of both the events in order to draw conclusions. 
Chapter VI will present conclusions based on the comparative analyses of all the 
variables and consideration of the facts of both 2010 disasters and will also draw 
recommendations to improve the disaster response in Pakistan in particular and any other 
part of the world in general. 
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II. HAITI EARTHQUAKE IN 2010 
A. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF HAITI 
Haiti became the world's first black led republic and the first independent 
Caribbean state when it threw off French colonial control and slavery in a series of wars 
in the early 19th century. However, due to sheer poverty, environmental degradation, 
violence, instability and dictatorship, it became the poorest nation in the Americas. It is a 
mostly mountainous country with a tropical climate. 
Haiti achieved notoriety during the brutal dictatorships of the voodoo physician 
Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier and his son, Jean Claude, or "Baby Doc."  During their 
twenty nine year regime tens of thousands of people were killed. After the 1990 election 
of a former priest, Jean Bertrand Aristide, it was hoped that he would lead the country to 
a brighter future; but he was overthrown by the military a short time later. Although 
economic sanctions and U.S. led military intervention forced a return to constitutional 
government in 1994, Haiti's fortune did not increase with allegations of electoral 
irregularities, ongoing extra judicial killings, torture and brutality.  A bloody revolt and 
external pressure from the U.S. and France forced Mr. Aristide out of the country in 
2004. Since then, an elected leadership has taken over from an interim government and a 
UN stabilization force has been deployed. But Haiti is still plagued by violent 
confrontations between rival gangs and political groups, and the human rights situation is 
downright catastrophic. 
Haiti has a very serious issue of a huge wealth gap between the impoverished 
Creole speaking black majority and the French speaking minority, 1% of who own nearly 
half the country's wealth. Many Haitians seek work and a better life in the U.S. or other 
Caribbean nations. The neighboring Dominican Republic is home to hundreds of 
thousands of Haitian migrants. Furthermore, the infrastructure has collapsed over time 
and drug trafficking has corrupted both the judicial system and the police. Haiti is very ill 
equipped to deal with the aftermath of the tropical storms that frequently sweep across  
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the island, with severe deforestation having left it vulnerable to flooding. It also lies in a 
region, which is prone to earthquakes. Some of the most important facts about the 
country are as follows:14 
• Full name: Republic of Haiti 
• Population: 10.2 million (UN, 2010) 
• Capital: Port au Prince, a coastal city with about two million inhabitants. 
The geographical coordinates of the city are 18°32'21''North latitude and 
72°20'6''West longitude. It is the largest city of the country situated at an 
altitude of 98 meters above sea level. The city can be accessed by the three 
airports: Port au Prince International, Cabo Rojo and Jacmel.  
• Administrative Divisions and Important Cities of Haiti are: Artibonite, 
Grand' Anse, Nord, Centre, Nippes, Nord Est, Sud, Sud Est, Quest and 
Nord Quest. 
 
Figure 2.   Political Map of Haiti15 
                                                 
14 BBC News, “Haiti country profile,” No Author. Accessed 26 March 2011. Available 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1202772.stm. 
15 Maps of World, “Map of the Haiti,” No Author. Accessed 26 March 2011. Available 
http://www.mapsofworld.com/haiti/haiti-political-map.html.  
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• Area: 27,750 sq km (10,714 sq miles) 
• Major languages: Creole, French 
• Life expectancy: 60 years (men), 64 years (women) (UN) 
• Monetary unit: 1 gourde = 100 centimes 
• Main exports: Light manufactures, coffee, oils, mangoes 
• GDP: $6,478,628,513 (2009) 16 
• GDP per capita (PPP): $1,300 – 203rd in the world (2008 est.) 
• GNI per capita: Estimated to be low income: $995 or less (World Bank, 
2009) 
• Eighty % of the population in Haiti is living under the poverty line. 
• Most Haitians live on less than $2 a day. 
• Population Growth rate: 1.84%  
• Urban population: 47% of total population  
• Ethnic groups: black 95%, mulatto and white 5% 
• Religions: Roman Catholic 80%, Protestant 16% (Baptist 10%, 
Pentecostal 4%, Adventist 1%, other 1%), none 1%, other 3%  (note: 
roughly half of the population practices voodoo) 
• Literacy rate: 35% 
• Labor force: 3.643 million (2008 est.), more than two thirds of the labor 
force do not have formal jobs. 
• The Haiti telecommunications infrastructure is among the least developed 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
• Haiti has fourteen airports, but only four have paved runways. 
• Haiti is one of the original members of the United Nations and several of 
its specialized and related agencies, as well as a member of the 
Organization of American States (OAS).17 
                                                 
16 The World Bank, “Data by country: Haiti,” No Author. Accessed 26 March 2011. Available 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/haiti.  




Figure 3.   Map of Haiti18 
B. NATURE OF DISASTER 
Earthquakes have killed more people in the last ten years than any other natural 
hazard. Almost 60 percent of the people killed by natural disasters between 2000 and 
2009 perished in earthquakes; but on the other hand, only four percent of the two billion 
people struck by disasters were affected by earthquakes. The earthquakes claimed more 
lives because they were sudden and had an immediate impact. Luckily, the area affected 
by earthquakes is comparatively small.19 
Since 1900, four out of five deaths caused by earthquakes have occurred in 
developing countries. In 1950, two of every three people living in earthquake threatened 
cities lived in developing countries, and by 2000 that number had increased to nine of 
every ten. Many developing countries do not have building codes; in those that do, the 
                                                 
18 “Map of Haiti…Old Treasure in the West Indies,” No Author. Accessed 26 March 2011. Available 
http://www.haitian-culture.com/map-of-haiti.html.  
19 IRIN Global, “DISASTERS: Earthquakes – the decade’s deadliest killer,” No Author. Accessed 27 
March 2011. Available http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=87908.  
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codes are often not enforced because of corruption and poor governance. These countries 
have fewer experts in earth science and earthquake engineering who are ill equipped and 
isolated.20 Investment in disaster risk reduction has become mandatory for every 
earthquake prone city or country. Earthquakes generally recur after a long period, and in 
Haiti the return period for this level may be about 100 years or more. Therefore, the main 
issue in Haiti is to reduce the crushing poverty that was the cause of many deaths after 
the country was struck by the earthquake.21  
C. FACTS ABOUT EARTHQUAKE IN HAITI 
The country was hit by an earthquake of magnitude 7.0 on January 12, 2010 at 
04:53:10 PM. Its epicenter was in position 18.443 N, 72.571 W at the depth of 13 km (8.1 
miles).  The epicenter was at the distance of 25 km (15 miles) WSW from Port Au 
Prince, 30 km (80 miles) E of Les Cayes, and 150 km (95 miles) S of Cap Haitian.22  
Figure 4 shows the epicenter of the earthquake. 
USGS called it the strongest earthquake since 1770 in what is now Haiti.  It left 
around three million people in need of emergency aid.  The major quake sent thirty-three 
aftershocks ranging in magnitude from 4.2 to 5.9.23 
The death toll from the Haiti earthquake was the fifth largest in recorded history 
of natural disasters. Around 230,000 people died, including 101 United Nations staff.  
Over 300,600 were wounded. Over 97,000 houses were destroyed, and over 188,000 
more were damaged to some degree. Three million people were affected, of whom 1.9 
million lost their homes, and over 511,000 had left the affected cities.24 
                                                 
20 GEOHAZARDS INTERNATIONAL, “Vulnerable Communities,” No Author. Accessed 27 March 
2011. Available http://www.geohaz.org/risk/vulnerable.html.  
21 IRIN Global, “DISASTERS: Earthquakes – the decade’s deadliest killer.”  
22 USGS, “Earthquake Hazards Program,” No Author. Accessed 24 March 2011. Available 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/recenteqsww/Quakes/us2010rja6.php. 
23 Fox News, “Fast Facts – Haiti Earthquake.”  
24 “Evaluation of OCHA Emergency Response to the Haiti Earthquake- Terms of Reference,” No 




Figure 4.   Haiti Earthquake Epicenter25 
An estimate of city wise population affected is shown in Table 2. 
City Population 
Petit Goave 118,000 
Gressier 26,000 




Port au Prince 1,235,000 
Delmas 73 383,000 
Verrettes 49,000 
Santo Domingo 2,202,000 
Table 2.   Estimate of Population Affected due to Earthquake in Haiti26 
                                                 
25 Maureen T. Morales and Rhoda Margesson, “Haiti Earthquake: Crises and Response,” CRS Report 
for Congress, 15 January 2010. Accessed 26 March 2011. Available 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41023_20100115.pdf. 
26 USGS, “M7.0 HAITI REGION Event ID: us2010rja6,” No Author, 12 January 2010. Accessed 26 
March 2011. Available http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/pager/events/us/2010rja6/onepager.pdf. 
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Figure 5.   An Estimate of the Population in Haiti and Surrounding Areas Exposed to 
Ground Shaking Caused by the January 12, 2010 Earthquake27 
                                                 
27 USGS, “M7.0 HAITI REGION Event ID: us2010rja6.”  
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D. PICTORIAL VIEW OF DAMAGE CAUSED BY EARTHQUAKE IN 
HAITI 
The following pictures in Figures 6–10 show the damage caused by the 
earthquake in Haiti; and also, some of the pictures show the comparison of the places 
before and after the earthquake hit.28 
 
Figure 6.   Inside the City of Port au Prince after the Earthquake 
                                                 












Figure 8.   Morne a Tuff, Haiti: Before and After the Earthquake 
 
Figure 9.   Downtown Port au Prince After the Earthquake 
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Figure 10.   The Presidential Palace at Port au Prince, Haiti 
 
 
Figure 11.   Port au Prince: Before and after the Earthquake 
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E. RESPONSE FROM WITHIN THE COUNTRY 
Immediately after the earthquake hit the country, the Haitian President appealed 
for international assistance and described conditions in his country as unimaginable. The 
search and rescue operation for survivors was declared as the top priority. Other material 
priorities included an offshore medical vessel and electricity generation capability. After 
those immediate needs were started to be met and humanitarian relief operations were in 
progress, the government tried to restore the institutions needed for it to function, and 
also to begin planning long term reconstruction and development.  The Presidential 
palace was destroyed, but the President survived and was running his nation from a small 
room. Prior to this disaster, the World Bank and others were working with the Haitian 
government to incorporate disaster risk management into Haiti’s overall development 
strategy and to develop its capacity for disaster response. The capacity was still in its 
early stages, and the focus of much of its risk management efforts was toward hurricanes, 
which are the most common cause of natural disasters on the island, because the last 
major earthquake hit Haiti was 150 years ago, in 1860. Haitian ministries had been 
working for long term housing for those left homeless by the earthquake as they operated 
out of makeshift offices. Haitian authorities, along with international relief agencies, had 
been delivering food and water to hundreds of makeshift camps in Port au Prince. The 
government provided free transportation to evacuate people from the capital to safe cities. 
The Haitian government sent officials to small cities to help local officials in those 
communities establish priorities.29  
Other elements of the government were also working along with international 
actors. For example, the Haitian National Police were contributing by maintaining 
security and Haitian air traffic controllers were working along with U.S. controllers at the 
Port au Prince airport. The government worked with USAID and others in the 
international community to assess damages and needs. The Haitian government, the 
United Nations, and donor representatives met in Haiti on January 14th to coordinate 
                                                 
29 Rhoda Margesson and Maureen T. Morales, “Haiti Earthquake: Crises and Response,” CRS Report 
for Congress, 2 February 2010. Accessed 26 March 2011. Available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41023.pdf. 
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their efforts. Haitian senators elected two commissions on January 28, 2010 to monitor 
aid and manage agreements with aid organizations.30 
F. RESPONSE FROM INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
The response to the Haiti earthquake by the international community was 
immediate and robust. The U.S., Canada, Brazil, Italy, and Cuba sent over 1,000 
personnel each. The international community provided over $2.5 billion in relief funding, 
the U.S. government alone provided more than $1.12 billion for earthquake relief and 
recovery. This response was enormously effective in saving lives and averting another 
immediate disaster, such as widespread disease, starvation, or major deaths from 
hurricane Tomas.31 
The Haiti earthquake ushered in a new humanitarian information environment: 
one with unprecedented availability of raw data, the growing usage of new information 
communication technology (ICT), and the emergence of three loosely connected 
communities of interest centered around the U.S. government, the United Nations and the 
international community, and a new group (ICT Volunteers) comprised of virtually 
connected academics, humanitarians, corporate foundations and ICT professionals. All 
three communities collected, shared, and acted upon enormous amounts of digital 
information made available on a variety of web portals, platforms and new social 
networking media, such as Short Message Service (SMS) feeds, Twitter and Facebook.32 
                                                 
30 Margesson and Morales, “Haiti Earthquake: Crises and Response.”  
31 Paul Weisenfeld, “Using Lessons from Earthquakes in Haiti and Chile to Reduce Global Risk,” 
Speech given at The National Academies Disasters Roundtable Workshop,1 March , 2011. Accessed 31 
March 2011. Available 
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/modules/whatsnew/national_acadamies_speech.ht
ml. 
32 Dennis King, “The Haiti earthquake: breaking new ground in the humanitarian information 
landscape,” Humanitarian Exchange issue 48, October 2010. Accessed 27 March 2011. Available 
http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=3135. 
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1. United Nations Humanitarian Response 
The U.N. Security Council increased the overall force of the U.N. Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which was established in April 2004, to support the 
immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts. The council decided to increase 
MINUSTAH personnel up to 8,940 military troops of all ranks and up to 3,711 police 
troops and review the strength as necessary, and could achieve 6,940 troops for the 
military component and 2,211 for the police component. The headquarters of the U.N. 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was demolished in the earthquake and a 
number of military and civilian MINUSTAH personnel died, including the head of 
MINUSTAH and his deputy. UN Secretary General Ban Ki moon appointed Edmond 
Mulet, Assistant Secretary General, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, to serve as Acting Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) 
and Head of MINUSTAH. MINUSTAH had been engaged in providing search and 
rescue operations, security, assistance, in creating and maintaining a secure environment 
for recovery and in training a viable police force.33 
The United Nations also established Disaster Assessment and Coordination 
(UNDAC) and the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
teams immediately after the disaster. The UNDAC team coordinated the Onsite 
Operations and Coordination Center (OSOCC). Two sub OSOCCs were established in 
Jacmel and Leogane to assist local authorities.34 On January 13, 2010, OCHA classified 
the response to Haiti earthquake as ‘corporate,’ requiring a ‘whole of organization’ effort, 
which was later deactivated on March 12, 2010. The OCHA Haiti office was expanded 
from five to over fifty international staff within the first week. The Flash Appeal, 
launched in a record of seventy two hours, requested US$575 million for an initial 6 
months period and it was over 100% funded. The Revised Humanitarian Appeal, 
launched on February 18th, asked for $1.4 billion over a one year period of relief and 
early recovery, was adjusted following a Mid Year Review (MYR) to $1.488 billion, of 
                                                 
33 Margesson and Morales, “Haiti Earthquake: Crises and Response.”  
34 King, “The Haiti earthquake: breaking new ground in the humanitarian information landscape.” 
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that 64 percent was funded as of July 24, 2010 for humanitarian operations alone. UN 
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) allocations exceeded US$36 million, and the 
Emergency Recovery and Reconciliation Fund (ERRF) support has been US$76 million, 
out of that some US$ 60 million have already been disbursed.35 
OCHA worked closely with the government of Haiti and was the lead agency 
working with all actors on the ground. The Humanitarian Country Team was convened 
on February 1st and held meetings twice a week. In consultation with MINUSTAH and 
international military forces, OCHA developed a Joint Operations Tasking Centre 
(JOTC), which began operating on January 26th and focused on civil military 
coordination and logistics. The OCHA Civil Military Coordination (CMCoord) team was 
convened on January 31, 2010 and brought together civil military points of contact from 
humanitarian organizations, MINUSTAH, and international military forces. 
Humanitarian relief sectors were typically established during humanitarian crises to 
enable the United Nations to coordinate partners, prioritize resources, and facilitate 
planning. Relief sectors were organized into twelve clusters led by various agencies. The 
clusters include:36 
• Agriculture (Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO) 
• Camp Coordination and Camp Management (International Organization 
for Migration, IOM) 
• Early Recovery (U.N. Development Program, UNDP) 
• Education (U.N. Children’s Fund, UNICEF) 
• Emergency Shelter and Non Food Items (IOM and the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, IFRC) 
• Emergency Telecommunications (World Food Program, WFP) 
• Food (World Food Program, WFP) 
• Health (World Health Organization, WHO, and Pan American Health 
Organization, PAHO) 
                                                 
35 “Evaluation of OCHA Emergency Response to the Haiti Earthquake.” 
36 King, “The Haiti earthquake: breaking new ground in the humanitarian information landscape.” 
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• Logistics (WFP) 
• Nutrition (UNICEF) 
• Protection (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
OHCHR), with Child Protection (UNICEF)  Gender Based Violence (U.N. 
Population Fund, UNFPA) 
• Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (UNICEF) 
These clusters were mobilized; for example, WFP was engaged in supporting 
immediate relief efforts and was also working on emergency logistics and 
telecommunications. Together with the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot 
(UNHRD), they were providing food from El Salvador as well as distributing relief 
supplies and food from a depot in Panama. WHO was coordinating medical assistance, 
particularly victim’s care. UNICEF focused on identifying and reuniting children with 
their families.37 
UN humanitarian agencies first began tracking the post earthquake situation using 
three OCHA managed web portals/platforms: GDACS, VOSOCC and ReliefWeb. UN 
Disaster Assessment Coordination (UNDAC) teams and international search and rescue 
teams were dispatched to Port au Prince, using VOSOCC to mobilize and coordinate 
deployment. The UNDAC team included information management and GIS personnel to 
provide situation reports and maps for the international humanitarian response 
community. The UN also launched a new OCHA portal, OneResponse, to store and share 
data, information and analysis related to each of the cluster activities. Several clusters set 
up Google Groups to facilitate information sharing, collaboration and coordination. 
Information management tools such as the Joint Operations Tasking Center (JOTC) 
logistics form, a Who is Doing What Where (3W) database, the Multi Cluster Rapid 
Assessment methodology, the Displacement Tracking Matrix, the Post Disaster Needs 
Assessment and Recovery Framework and the Cluster meeting calendar and directories 
were established to facilitate coordination and information management.38  
                                                 
37 King, “The Haiti earthquake: breaking new ground in the humanitarian information landscape.” 
38 Ibid. 
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2. The U.S. Government Response 
The Haiti earthquake marked the largest U.S. humanitarian response to a natural 
disaster, code named Operation Unified Response Haiti. USAID was designated as the 
lead agency for the U.S. humanitarian response. As of August 13, 2010, USAID had 
committed over $655 million in supplies, grants and support. At the height of the disaster 
response, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) dedicated approximately 22,000 
personnel, deployed 33 ships and 130 aircraft for humanitarian transport, emergency 
shelter distribution to 1.5 million people and a vaccination campaign for more than 1 
million people.  The U.S. Department of State obligated $11.2 million to assist displaced 
people and host families and to support repatriation and resettlement programs. Because 
of its proximity to Haiti, the U.S. was quickly able to dispatch a USAID Disaster 
Assistance Response Team (DART) and SOUTHCOM personnel set up U.S. Joint Task 
Force Haiti to manage and coordinate logistics and to support other U.S. government 
humanitarian response activities. Coordination centers were established at SOUTHCOM 
headquarters in Miami and at USAID and the State Department in Washington. Defense, 
State and USAID personnel were assigned to each other’s coordination centers to serve 
as liaisons and advisors in an effort to develop and implement a ‘whole of government’ 
approach to the response. Representatives from UN agencies and NGOs also served as 
liaisons in some of these coordination centers, as well as with some U.S. government 
teams in Haiti. This helped to establish personal relationships, facilitate information 
sharing and provide greater mutual understanding. Another key decision was to use 
unclassified information whenever possible, and to use public platforms for sharing 
information. Much of the Defense Department’s humanitarian relevant data and 
information was kept unclassified and shared widely within the Haiti earthquake 
response. SOUTHCOM launched the All Partners Access Network (APAN), a platform 
originally developed by U.S. Pacific Command, to share unclassified information and 
enhance collaboration and operational coordination. SOUTHCOM made password 
registration available to anyone on request, and within three weeks APAN had over 1,800 
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registered users. Imagery products, maps, photos, assessments, situation reports, common 
operational pictures and requests for information were all made available on APAN.39 
The main U.S. government elements involved include U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), U.S. Department of Defense/U.S. Southern 
Command (SOUTHCOM), U.S. Department of State, Department of Homeland 
Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA), U.S. Coast Guard, 
Department of Health and Human Services, and United States Geological Survey; they 
all worked at Haiti.  The portals/platforms used were All Partner Access Network 
(APAN), Intellipedia, Diplopedia, and Civil Military Fusion Center. 
3. ICT Volunteers 
Within hours of the earthquake, a new community of virtually connected 
volunteers affiliated with ICT consulting companies, private corporations, open source 
software proponents, academic/research institutions, NGOs and the Haitian diaspora 
began applying new ICT applications to the earthquake response. Web 2.0 social network 
media were used as a new means of data collection, information sharing and 
collaboration. Within days, individuals from this community, with support from the U.S. 
State Department, worked with ICT companies to establish an SMS 4636 code for the 
free transmission of text messages to and from Haiti. Google adapted its suite of tools to 
support the Haiti earthquake response and helped develop a Person Finder application to 
help find and connect people in Haiti who could not be contacted. Microsoft and Infusion 
provided technical assistance to the Inter American Development Bank in creating a 
Haitian Integrated Government Platform to aggregate data on humanitarian and 
reconstruction activities in order to track and gauge progress. A nascent, virtual 
CrisisMappers network utilized an open source interactive mapping platform known as 
Ushahidi to gather, extract and plot geo referenced data on a public website. Over the 
course of the disaster, Ushahidi and volunteer diaspora translators received over 80,000 
text messages; approximately 3,000 were used in some way during the response. Other 
geo referenced data was gleaned from Twitter, blogs, the news media and humanitarian 
                                                 
39 King, “The Haiti earthquake: breaking new ground in the humanitarian information landscape.” 
 29
situation reports to provide situational awareness products, including maps. The U.S. 
Coast Guard, the 22nd U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit and other first responders used 
these social media platforms to support their emergency assistance operations. 
Individuals from the U.S. government, the UN and some NGOs were also connected to 
this network. The main ICT Organizations working in Haiti included Google, InSTEDD, 
Fortius One/GeoCommons, OpenStreet Map, Tufts/Harvard universities, Frontline SMS, 
ICT4Peace, Sahana, Thompson Reuters Foundation and Microsoft.  The 
Portals/platforms used were CrisisMappers.net, SMS 4636, Ushahidi, Star Tides, Haiti 
Voices, ICT4Peace Inventorization Wiki, CrisisCamp Haiti, CrisisCommons Wiki, 
crisescomm.ning.com, etc.40 
4. Response from Regional Countries 
Latin American countries responded to Haiti’s crisis with immediate provision of 
emergency supplies, personnel, financial help and other assistance for its long term 
recovery. Members of the Organization of American States (OAS) Group of Friends of 
Haiti met on January 14th to coordinate search and rescue efforts, prompt donations, and 
discuss ways to promote recovery. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) mobilized 
its disaster emergency response system to assist Haiti and several member states provided 
emergency supplies and financial assistance. The Caribbean Disaster Emergency 
Management Agency assembled a response team to assess conditions in Haiti as well. 
Many countries in the region already had peacekeeping troops in Haiti serving with 
MINUSTAH. Brazil was leading the participation in UN peacekeeping mission and had 
1,284 uniformed personnel already serving there as of December 2009.41 
                                                 
40 Morales and Margesson, “Haiti Earthquake: Crises and Response.” 
41 Ibid. 
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5. General Facts/Figures 
Below are some of the facts and figures, which highlight the amount of work done 
and achievements by the international community for Haiti after the earthquake:42 
• Around 1,000 humanitarian organizations participated in the earthquake 
relief operations. 
• Representatives from 216 organizations, including UN agencies, UN 
affiliated organization, NGOs, military responders, and government, have 
attended Logistics Cluster meetings. 
• The logistics cluster facilitated the deliveries of emergency relief items 
through a truck fleet managed by Handicap International/Atlas Logistique. 
• Up until October 2010, 10,050 mt (46,500 m3) of relief goods had been 
dispatched from Port au Prince to the affected places (90% by land and 
10% by air). These dispatches include 48% shelter items, 15% food items, 
15% agriculture items, 8% water and sanitization items and 5% logistics 
equipment for 106 different organizations working on ground. Also 1,300 
truckloads have been dispatched from Santo Domingo to Haiti delivering 
more than 9,300 mt (35,000 m3) of relief supplies. 
• Fifty organizations have used storage facilities available for the 
Humanitarian Community in Port au Prince. In additional, a number of 
storage places were arranged at other locations for relief organizations.  
• As of August 2010, over 15,000 passengers from some 500 different UN 
Agencies, donors, NGOs, governments, embassies and media institutions 
have used the UNHAS passenger transport services. The helicopters have 
flown numerous assessment missions to more than ninety isolated villages 
and have delivered more than 900 mt (3,100 m3), mainly medicines, food 
and shelter items to forty eight different locations. 
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• Since June 21, 2010, a chartered 1,500 mt barge has been providing a 
viable alternative to road transport for the humanitarian response 
programs. 
• A 1x Mi-171 helicopter with a 3 mt capacity was available for use to 
deliver relief goods to inaccessible areas. MINUSTAH, U.S. and Canadian 
military helicopters were available for additional airlift capacity through 
the JOTC. 
G. HURRICANE TOMAS LOSSES 
On November 5, 2010, hurricane Tomas passed within about 140 miles (230 
kilometers) of Port au Prince. In the town of Jérémie, many houses were destroyed, trees 
downed and rivers flooded, and a huge area of the coastal city of Leogane was inundated 
with several feet of water.43 The camps in the Haitian capital housing 1.3 million quake 
survivors remained safe. The hurricane, however, killed six people and about 10,000 
people were evacuated from their homes to escape floodwaters. Due to early warning, 
people were well prepared; there was good cooperation between the government and the 
aid community and the worst effects were therefore avoided. Flooding in a number of 
locations posed the risk of worsening the cholera epidemic, which over two weeks had 
killed more than 440 people and sickened more than 6,700. Relief agencies rushed clean 
drinking water and food to areas affected by the floods to avoid spread of diarrhea. One 
of the worst hit zones was Leogane, a town west of Port au Prince, which was badly 
damaged in the January earthquake. Some 90,000 people were already living in tent 
camps. Flooding was also reported in the coastal towns of Les Cayes, Jacmel and 
Gonaives.44 Some details of other damages caused by the hurricane were:45 
                                                 
43 CNN Wire Staff, “Hurricane Tomas lashes already devastated Haiti,” No Author, 5 November 
2010. Accessed 1 April 2011. Available http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-05/world/tropical.weather_1_haiti-
flash-floods-and-mudslides-storm-shelters?_s=PM:WORLD. 
44 Mattew Bigg, “Haiti dodges storm disaster, but urgent needs remain,” REUTERS, 6 November 
2010. Accessed 1 April 2011. Available http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/06/us-haiti-storm-
idUSTRE6A27Z220101106. 
45 CCCM, “Hurricane Tomas and cholera response Situation Report,” No Author, 12 November 2010. 
Accessed 1 April 2011. Available http://www.cccmhaiti.info/page.php?id=32. 
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• Number of families affected:  19,739 
• Tents damaged:     9,676 
• Tents destroyed:     2,140 
• Tents flooded :     4,848 
• Number of sites with latrines flooded: 53 (With a reported number of 142 
latrines)  
• Number of sites with latrines damaged: 40 (With a reported number of 100 
latrines)  
• Camps with significant standing water:  126 
• Camps with blocked canals:      65 
H. RESPONSE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DURING 
THE HURRICANE 
The international community helped the Haitian government to respond to the 
effects of Hurricane Tomas.  The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) 
coordinated the U.S. government’s response, working closely with the government of 
Haiti’s Departement de Protection Civile (DPC), the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH), USAID implementing partners throughout the country, ships and 
helicopters from the U.S. Southern Command and the U.S. Coast Guard.  In response to 
humanitarian needs among affected populations following the storm, the DART 
authorized the release from prepositioned stocks of kitchen sets, hygiene kits, water 
containers, blankets, and plastic sheets to benefit 27,500 people, both in Jérémie and Les 
Cayes in southwestern Haiti, as well as residents in some of the displaced persons camps 
in and around Port au Prince. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps helicopters from the U.S.S. 
Iwo Jima performed a number of damage assessment missions over Haiti, and in 
coordination with MINUSTAH, provided information in support of the Haitian 
government’s needs.  Measures taken by USAID in and around Gonaives, such as soil 
stabilization and reforestation, the rehabilitation and construction of storm canals, a 
drainage system in the city, and the expansion of a drainage lake were instrumental in 
increasing water flow, and thus prevented the type of damage that Gonaives has seen in 
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previous such storms. The U.S. government also supported the DPC, the agency on the 
front lines of Haiti’s disaster response; funded the government of Haiti’s interagency 
command center, as well as the construction of emergency operations centers and disaster 
relief warehouses; supported efforts to communicate with affected populations, including 
through SMS and radio; and delivered equipment, including foul weather gear and 
megaphones.46 
A number of UN agencies including the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which coordinated preparations for the hurricane; 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), which moved thousands of people from 
exposed camps to safe places; UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which 
assisted local authorities by providing transportation for people to move to provisional 
shelters; UN World Health Organization (WHO), which sent 10,000 emergency health 
kits to Port au Prince and 10,000 to 20,000 kits to other areas for treating water borne 
diseases and UN children’s Fund (UNICEF) had been sharing health and sanitation 
related information and distributing oral rehydration salts and water purification tablets.47 
The United Nations World Food Program (WFP) has been working closely with the 
Haitian authorities and other partners to distribute high energy biscuits and ready to eat 
meals (MREs) to thousands of people who had taken refuge in schools and churches in 
the southwest of the country.  In some of the most storm affected areas, such as Jérémie, 
distributions began within hours of the first heavy rains.48 
                                                 
46 Embassy of the United States at Port-au-Prince, Press Release, No Author, 8 November 2010. 
Accessed 1 April 2011. Available http://haiti.usembassy.gov/press-releases-2012/u.s.-government-assists-
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47 UN News Centre, “UN system prepares for landfall of Hurricane Tomas on Haiti,” No Author. 
Accessed 1 April 2011. Available 
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48 World Food Programme New, “WFP Delivers Emergency Food Supplies in Haiti After Hurricane 
Tomas,” No Author, 7 November 2010. Accessed 1 April 2011. Available http://www.wfp.org/news/news-
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I. MODERN TOOLS USED DURING EARTHQUAKE RELIEF 
OPERATIONS BY RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS 
Every modern disaster response operation requires reliable modes of 
communication; but in Haiti, the importance of the media rose to a new level. Haiti 
became the first real world crisis laboratory for several media platforms and tools that 
had only recently emerged. These tools were applied to support rescue efforts, assist 
displaced populations and coordinate massive relief operations. The Haitian earthquake 
marked the first large scale application of new approaches to create a connection and 
information exchange mechanism between citizens and relief workers, such as crowd 
sourcing and other projects, which combined the reach of cell phones and radio 
technology. The new tools encouraged new forms of collaboration among local media, 
technological innovators, and large international organizations.49 
Technology was used for fund raising via SMS donations and many Americans 
first heard of digital charity through the Red Cross 90999 campaign for Haiti. This 
technique helped raised $5 million within forty four hours of the earthquake and $20 
million within five days.50 
Once the text messaging system was set up, additional technology teams set to 
work. International Media Support, a Copenhagen based NGO, worked with Internews 
and other organizations to create a mapping system based on Google maps to identify 
working radio stations in the Port au Prince area. Within days, thousands of messages 
were received and teams of Haitians from the diaspora volunteered to translate and map 
the information, which was then delivered to all the actors involved in the relief 
operations.51  Some of the most important tools used during relief operations are 
described in the following paragraphs. 
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1. Social Networking and Crisis Management 
The trend of using social networking sites to stay in regular contact with one 
another has increased throughout the world. These sites have featured prominently in 
recent disasters, especially with the Haiti earthquake. People used these sites to share 
links to web resources, as well as photos and videos uploaded by those near the disaster. 
Tools like Twitter coordinate well with sites like Facebook to allow users the ability to 
send a quick update to their Facebook page with a text message from their phone. The 
Red Cross launched the Safe and Well List where people can quickly register and 
indicate that they are safe and sound. Family and friends can search for a relative using 
the same site and verify their loved ones' safety. People in or near a disaster area can send 
a text message from their phone to the Safe and Well List via Twitter, or they can use the 
full website interface.52 In case of a disaster in bigger urban areas, available bandwidth 
may be constrained due to loss of some of communication infrastructure, heavy 
communication requirements by the relief agencies and extensive use of social media and 
other communication channels by the public because everybody would be trying to 
contact their loved ones or would be asking for help.  Therefore, media may try to bring 
awareness among the people for judicious and right use of social media at the time of 
disasters to avoid jamming or slowing the communication and depriving everyone of this 
useful facility, which may cause more loss of life.   
2. Ushahidi 
One of the most important tools used in Haiti was Ushahidi, an open source tool 
that allows users to report events via text message, and for those reports to be located on 
an online map. In Haiti, eyewitnesses used Ushahidi to report events such as survivors 
who were trapped under collapsed buildings. Using the GPS coordinates of the phone that 
the text messages were sent from, these reports were mapped online, allowing volunteers 
to direct relief resources to victims’ location. Ushahidi and many of the other disaster 
                                                 
52 Penn State College of Earth and Mineral Sciences Website, “Lesson 8: Case Study Collaborative 
Project,” No Author, 14 December 2010. Accessed 27 March 2011. Available https://www.e-
education.psu.edu/geog588/l8_p5.html. 
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relief tools were developed by volunteer programmers who gave their free time to build 
these applications that can save lives. These tools are the work of loosely coupled 
organizations such as Crisis Camp, a community of volunteer developers that organizes 
networking events around the world. Its members collaborate on prototype methods for 
aggregating and understanding crisis data and build applications to help organize disaster 
response teams. The tools that Crisis Camp members donated to the Haiti relief effort 
ranged from a mobile application that translates text messages from Haitian Creole into 
English, to an entire online social network for relief workers.53 
 
Figure 12.   SMS Reporting and Feedback Cycle in Ushahidi v0.154 
3. Global Disaster Alert Coordination System (GDACS) 
The Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System provides near real time alerts 
about natural disasters around the world and tools to facilitate response coordination, 
including media monitoring, map catalogues and Virtual On Site Operations 
                                                 
53 Daniel Shane, “Pulling together in a crisis,” 28 February 2011. Accessed 27 March 2011. Available 
http://www.information-age.com/channels/information-management/it-case-studies/1605603/pulling-
together-in-a-crisis.thtml. 
54 Coyle and Meler, “New Technologies in Emergencies and Conflicts,” 3. 
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Coordination Centre.55 GDACS automatically monitors earthquakes. For each 
earthquake, it calculates humanitarian impact based on magnitude, depth, affected 
population and their vulnerability and resilience. Detailed reports with affected 
infrastructure are available and updated regularly.  Every fifteen minutes, GDACS 
collects in an automatic way, media reports, damage maps, ReliefWeb situation reports 
and more about the earthquakes. 
4. Virtual On Site Operations Coordination Center (VOSOCC) 
The Virtual On Site Operations Coordination Centre (VOSOCC) is a web based 
information management tool developed by the Field Coordination Support Section 
(FCSS) of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA), Geneva. The VOSOCC is an integral partner of the Global Disaster Alert and 
Coordination System (GDACS). The GDACS provides near real time alerts of natural 
disasters around the world to facilitate response coordination, including media 
monitoring, map catalogues and the VOSOCC. The VOSOCC is designed as an online 
information portal for the facilitation of information exchange between responders and 
affected counties before, during and after sudden onset disasters. Access to the VOSOCC 
is password restricted to disaster managers from governments and disaster response 
organizations. The main two requirements of the VOSOCC are operational 
communication, which includes the information exchange in the run up to and during a 
disaster, and the preparatory communication, which includes information exchange used 
for the building of understanding through training events, meetings and other 
discussions.56 
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This portal serves the information needs of the humanitarian relief community. 
This site makes it easier to find what you're looking for. All key pages, like the new 
'updates' page and country pages, have a power browser that lets you quickly filter down 
to relevant humanitarian reports, maps and other content.57 
6. OneResponse 
OneResponse is a collaborative inter agency website designed to enhance 
humanitarian coordination within the cluster approach, and support the predictable 
exchange of information in emergencies at the country level. The website supports 
Clusters and OCHA fulfill their information management responsibilities as per existing 
Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) guidance.  
7. GoogleGroups 
This is a social networking site offered by Google, which lets people create an 
account, setup a group and then invite people to join the group. These groups can then be 
used for online discussions or emails. During a disaster, these groups may be used by 
people to share information regarding their status with their friends and relatives.  They 
may also ask those who are living at safe places to get them help if they need any.  If 
local disaster management authorities work to prepare a group of locals, it can use this 
platform as a means to educate people to prepare for disaster response and preparedness.  
And after a disaster occurs, it could use this group to update their plots of the affected 
areas and population and conduct the relief and recovery operations more effectively.  
There were a number of Google groups, which connected Haitians and other people 
related to the relief and recovery operation for better coordination and to maintain 
communication.58  
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AlertNet is a free humanitarian news service website run by Thomson Reuters 
Foundation that provides trusted news and information on natural disasters, conflicts, 
refugees, hunger, diseases and climate change. The site is very useful for relief workers, 
donors, policymakers, researchers, students, journalists and the general public.59 
9. All Partner Access Network (APAN) 
After the earthquake in Haiti, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) made 
available a web based tool named All Partners Access Network (APAN), which was an 
unclassified, open source method of sharing information with the entire international 
relief community.  All Partners Access Network (APAN) was designed by U.S. Pacific 
Command to enhance collaboration and operational coordination. With its open password 
registration, APAN attracted over 1,800 users during the first three weeks following the 
Haiti earthquake, and quickly became one of SOUTHCOM’s chief means of sharing 
information outside the command’s domain.  It helped SOUTHCOM respond to requests 
for assistance, maintain situational awareness through user updates, and share DOD 
imagery with the international community.60 The All Partners Access Network (APAN) 
enables networking and communication, increases situational awareness and provides a 
forum for sharing lessons learned and best practices in crisis response, humanitarian 
assistance, disaster relief, and training and exercises.61  
10. Civil Military Fusion Center 
In the Civil Military Fusion Center (CFC), a team of civilian and military subject 
matter experts work closely with one another to gather, analyze, and share the relevant 
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information pertaining to a crisis situation through a website portal called the Civil 
Military Overview (CMO). The key components of the CFC are its sector focused 
Knowledge Managers (KM), whose experience and expertise allow them to better 
assemble, edit, fuse and disseminate the right type of sector information to the 
CMO’s user community. KMs are representatives from recognized, credible, and like 
minded security and humanitarian organizations. As such, they have the ability to “reach 
back” to the resources, expertise and contacts of their parent organizations. This 
arrangement greatly expands the social network of the CFC and its access to the relevant 
information surrounding a natural or manmade crisis.62 
11. OpenStreetMap 
OpenStreetMap is a community of approximately 150,000 mappers dedicated to 
build a free and open map of the world. Approximately 640 mappers participated in the 
efforts to build an open base map of Haiti. OpenStreetMap did a great job in Haiti and 
provided an updated and accurate street map of Haiti from scratch in about two weeks, a 
project that would have usually taken about a year.63 
12. CrisisCamps/CrisisCommons 
CrisesCamp/CrisesCommons started in 2009 as a venue through those crisis 
response professionals could explore ways to share best practices. It transformed into a 
structure for mobilizing almost 2,000 laypeople (mostly technologists) in twenty five 
cities around the world to swarm around information needs generated by the Haiti 
operation.64 
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13. 4636 Alliance 
4636 Alliance is a partnership of FrontlineSMS, the Thompson Reuters 
Foundation Emergency Information Service, InSTEDD, and Internews to offer an SMS 
short code and associated services to Haitian citizens. It was affiliated with the 
Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities initiative.65 InSTEDD brought 
together leading figures from the technology field and the technology team settled on the 
digits 4636. Digicel, Haiti’s largest telecom, agreed to make it available to the public for 
free. Initially, Digicel service was the only means through that the Haitian population 
could make remote contact with aid agencies for no cost; but later Voila, Haiti’s second 
largest telecom, joined the effort and added a second short code 200.66 
14. Crisis Mappers and Open Aerial Mapping 
A GeoEye/Google partnership released high resolution imagery of the Haiti 
twenty six hours after the quake. Digital Globe soon followed. The providers released the 
imagery under an “attribution only” license that allowed derived works and redistribution 
via other online and offline channels. The Disaster Risk Management group in the World 
Bank in coordination with Crisis Mappers commissioned the Rochester Institute of 
Technology (RIT) and ImageCat to collect 15 cm aerial imagery of Port au Prince. From 
January 21–29, 2010, the teams’ flew a prop aircraft in box patterns and released the 
imagery into the public domain. This transformed the work of the response. A 
community of geospatial experts, loosely coordinated by the Crisis Mappers’ mailing list, 
applied geospatial and crowdsourcing tools for the analysis of humanitarian emergencies. 
Around 550 of its members participated in the Haiti efforts and became the central 
mechanism for coordinating imagery and mapping activities in Haiti. Its members 
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Emergencies.” 
66 Ibid . 
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included representatives from UNOSAT, Google, GeoEye, Digital Globe, 
OpenStreetMap, and the San Diego State University Visualization Lab.67 
                                                 
67 Crowley and Chan, “DISASTER RELIEF 2.0: The Future of Information Sharing in Humanitarian 
Emergencies.” 
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III. PAKISTAN FLOODS IN 2010 
In the past I have visited the scenes of many natural disasters around the 
world, but nothing like this. I will never forget the destruction and 
suffering I have witnessed today. The scale of this disaster is so large, so 
many people, in so many places, in so much need 
    UN Secretary General Ban Ki moon68  
Make no mistake: this is a global disaster, a global challenge. It is one of 
the greatest tests of global solidarity in our times. Pakistan is facing a slow 
motion tsunami  
    UN Secretary General Ban Ki moon69 
The Muslim majority state of Pakistan was born out of the partition of the Indian 
subcontinent in 1947 to meet the demands of Indian Muslims for their own homeland. 
Pakistan was originally in two parts. The east wing, present day Bangladesh, is on the 
Bay of Bengal bordering India and Burma. The west wing, present day Pakistan, stretches 
from the Himalayas down to the Arabian Sea. The breakup of the two wings came in 
1971 when the mainly Bengali speaking east wing wanted a separate independent 
country. Civilian politics in Pakistan in the last few decades has been tarnished by 
corruption, inefficiency and confrontations between various institutions. Alternating 
periods of democracy and military dictatorship have not helped to establish stability. 
Pakistan came under military rule again in October 1999 under coup leader, General 
Pervez Musharraf, who then pledged to revive the country's fortunes, but faced economic 
challenges as well as an increasing polarization between Islamist militancy and the 
modernizing secular wing of Pakistani politics. Pakistan's regained its importance in the 
world stage after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. It suspended its 
support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and was propelled into the frontline in the 
fight against Al Qaeda and terrorism, becoming a key ally of Washington. Internal 
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politics in the country once again saw a change when, under growing pressure to 
reintroduce democracy, Mr. Musharraf relinquished as army chief in November 2007. At 
parliamentary elections in February 2008, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and former 
Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif's party Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz group 
(PML(N)) had a joint victory and forced Mr. Musharraf to resign in August 2008. 
Pakistani forces are heavily engaged on its eastern borders to maintain defenses along the 
border with India and are also struggling to maintain control over the restive tribal 
regions along the Afghan border, where Taliban linked militants became firmly 
entrenched. The country is prone to floods and also earthquakes. Some important facts 
about the country are:70 
• Full name: Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
• Population: 184.7 million (UN, 2010) 
• Capital: Islamabad 
• Largest city: Karachi 
• Area: 796,095 sq km (307,374 sq miles), excluding Pakistani administered 
Kashmir (83,716 sq km/32,323 sq miles) 
• Major languages: English, Urdu, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashto, Balochi 
• Major religion: Islam 
• Life expectancy: 68 years (men), 68 years (women) (UN) 
• Monetary unit: 1 Pakistani Rupee (PKR)=100 paisa; (USD 1=PKR 
84.818)71 
• Main exports: Textile products, rice, cotton, leather goods 
• GNI per capita, PPP: US$2,680 (World Bank, 2009)72 
• GDP (US$ in millions): 161,990.0 (World Bank, 2009) 
• Sex Ratio (males per 100 females): 108.5 
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• GDP per Capita: $1,013 (World Bank: Key Development Data & 
Development) 
• Percentage of Population living on less than $1.25 per day: 22.6% 
(UNDP: Human Development Report (HDR) 2009) 
 
Figure 13.   Map of Pakistan73 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FLOODS IN PAKISTAN 
Pakistan has five main rivers the Indus River, which is one of the largest rivers of 
the world and the main river of the country originating from north of the Himalayas; the 
                                                 
73 Geology.com, “Pakistan Map – Pakistan Satellite Image,” No Author. Accessed 25 March 2011. 
Available http://geology.com/world/pakistan-satellite-image.shtml.  
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Jhelum River originating from Kashmir valley; the Chenab River originating from 
occupied Jammu and Kashmir; the Ravi River originating from the lesser Himalaya 
Range in India; and the Sutlaj River originating in Western Tibet in the Kailas Mountain 
range and near the source of River Indus. Pakistan also has a number of small rivers such 
as Kabul, Swat, Haro, Kunhar, Chitral, Tochi, Shah Alam, Naguman, Adezai, Soan, etc. 
All the rivers of the country have their origin in the north at higher altitudes and mainly 
derive their flows from monsoon rains and melting snow. There are two main dams built 
for water storage and power generation, the Tarbela Dam on the Indus River and the 
Mangla Dam on the Jhelum River; some smaller dams also exist on these rivers. There 
are around nineteen barrages on all the rivers for regulating the water for irrigation and 
controlling the flow of water during flood season as well. Some of the more important 
ones include Marala, Khanki, Qadirabad, Trimmu and Punjnad on the Chenab River, and 
Kalabgh, Chahsma, Taunsa, Guddu, Sakhur and Kotri on Indus River. Structures on 
Indus River system are shown schematically in Figure 14.74 
 
Figure 14.   Structures on Indus River System  
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Pakistan has been suffering flooding from the Indus River and its twenty seven 
major tributaries throughout its history and considers flooding to be the major natural 
calamity, which the country has been facing regularly at different times. The detail of 
damage it suffered due to flooding from 1955 to 2007 is shown in Table 3.  
Value of Property damaged 
(Rs in Millions) 
Year 
Unadjusted Adjusted 
Lives Lost Villages 
Affected 
1950  199.80 11,282.00 2,190 10,000 
1956 155.50 7,356.00  160  11,609 
1957 152.50 6,958.00  83  4,498 
1973 5,137.00 118,684.00 474  9,719 
1976 5,880.00 80,504.00 425  18,390 
1978 4,478.00 51,489.00 393  9,199 
1988 6,879.00 25,630.00 508  1,000 
1992 34,751.00 69,580.00 1,008  13,208 
1995  6,125.00 8,698.00 591  6,85 
2001 450.00 450.00  219  50 
2003 5,175.00 5,175.00 484  4,376 
2004  15.00  15.00  85  47 
2005  Not Reported  59*  1,931 
2007 Not Reported  1781+ 2 million+75 
Table 3.   Historical Flood Damages in Pakistan (1950–2007)76 
In Pakistan, flooding in rivers is generally caused by heavy rainfall in the 
catchments during the monsoon season, which is sometimes augmented by snowmelt 
flows as well. Monsoon currents originating in the Bay of Bengal and resultant 
depressions often cause heavy rains in the Himalayan foothills. These are additionally 
affected by weather systems from the Arabian Sea (by seasonal lows) and from the 
                                                 
75 Wikipedia, “List of Floods in Pakistan,” No Author. Accessed 4 April 2011.  Available 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_floods_in_Pakistan#Historical_floods_in_Pakistan.  
76 Noreen Haider, “Living With Disasters: Disaster profiling of districts of Pakistan.” Accessed 4 
April 2011. Available http://www.ndma.gov.pk/Publications/livingwithdisasters.pdf.  
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Mediterranean Sea (through westerly waves), which occasionally contribute in building 
up destructive floods in one or more of the main rivers of the Indus system. The 
formation of temporary natural dams by landslides or glacier movement and their 
subsequent collapse has also caused heavy floods in the country. Another factor is 
temperature obtaining in central Pakistan, which is southern Punjab, upper Sindh and 
northeastern Balochistan, during the monsoon months.77 
Because of regular floods in the region, Pakistan, soon after its creation in 1947, 
recognized the need for establishing an early flood forecasting and warning system. A 
fully fledged flood forecasting system (FFS) was in fact established after the country 
suffered devastating flooding in 1976. However, the system was further matured after 
learning lessons and exploring weaknesses during the floods of 1988, 1992, 1996 and 
1997. Thus, the system went through many improvements over time and has now become 
sufficiently comprehensive; but it still needs much more concentrated efforts to make it 
more self contained and modernized. The following organizations have been established 
and/or equipped over time for early warning, forecasting and mitigation of floods in 
Pakistan:78 
• National Disaster and Management Authority (NDMA) 
• Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA) 
• Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) 
• Provincial Relief Organization 
• Pakistan Army 
• Pakistan Navy 
• Commissioner for Indus Water (CIW) 
• Emergency Relief Cell (ERC) 
• Federal Flood Commission (FFC) 
• Flood Forecasting Division (FFD) 
 
                                                 
77 Haider, “Living With Disasters: Disaster profiling of districts of Pakistan.” 
78 South Asian Floods (SAF), “Pakistan: An Introduction,” No Author. Accessed 4 April 2011. 
Available http://southasianfloods.icimod.org/contents.php?country_code=PK&c_id=11. 
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B. FACTS ABOUT 2010 FLOOD IN PAKISTAN 
 
Figure 15.   Gushing Water in Swat Valley79 
Over the course of the monsoon season in July and August 2010, Pakistan 
experienced the worst floods recorded in its history. Heavy rainfall caused flash and 
riverine floods in the north and northwestern regions of Pakistan, including parts of the 
provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Gilgit Baltistan (GB), Balochistan, and Azad 
Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) that combined to create a moving body of water equal in 
dimension to the land mass of the United Kingdom and travelling southwards. The high 
intensity rainfall in KPK generated unprecedented flood peaks in the Swat River. These 
floods severely damaged the Amandara Headworks and washed away the Munda 
Headworks, both major irrigation structures. The combined flow of the Swat and Kabul 
Rivers generated another unprecedented flood peak at the town of Nowshehra, causing 
severe damage. The flood waters travelled downstream through the barrages in Punjab 
and Sindh until they reached the Arabian Sea downstream of the Kotri Barrage. Extreme 
high floods were recorded at the Chashma and Taunsa Barrages, and a near historic flood 
peak was also recorded at the Kotri Barrage. Many of the main irrigation canals that take 
water from the Indus River were also flooded, pouring water onto agricultural lands. This 
                                                 
79 Pakistan Travel and Culture, “Flood in Pakistan Scientific Facts and History,” No Author, 20August 
2010. Accessed 4 April 2011. Available http://blog.travel-culture.com/2010/08/20/flood-in-pakistan-
scientific-facts-and-history/. 
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situation was compounded by additional heavy rains, and the breaching of major canals 
and embankments and diversion of the water in an attempt to prevent flooding of the 
urban areas.80 
1. Important Facts and Figures of the Floods 
Some important facts and figures to highlight the losses and damage caused by 
the floods are appended below:81,82 
• Population affected:  20,184,550 (approx)  
• Deaths    1,985 
• Injured    2,946 
• Household Damage  1,744,471 
• Area impacted:  150,000 sq. km  
• Seventy eight of country’s 141 districts affected 
• 3.4 million children under five years of age were among the affected 
• 600,000 expectant or lactating mothers 
• 6.2 million consultations by September 20, 2010 for skin diseases, acute 
respiratory infections, acute diarrhea, suspected malaria and bloody 
diarrhea 
• 12,516 school facilities either partially or fully damaged 
• Five hundred health facilities out of 2,957 damaged or destroyed 
• 1.66 million homes damaged or destroyed 
• Seventeen million acres (out of total of 43 million acres) of farmland 
impacted 
• Nine million acres of standing crops lost 
                                                 
80 Reliefweb, “Pakistan Floods 2010: Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment,” No Author, p.19. 
Accessed 2 April 2011. Available 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/MUMA-8B68ST-
full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf. 
81 Data provided by Head of Chancery at Embassy of Pakistan, Washington DC during meeting on 24 
February 2011. 
82 Pakistan Floods, No Author. Accessed 27 March 2011. Available 
http://www.pakistanfloods.pk/daily-updates/situation-report. 
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• One million tons of stored grain lost 
• Planting of winter crops became difficult in affected areas because of 
water logged soil, and lack of seed and fertilizer 
• More than 1.2 million large and small animals killed and 6 million poultry 
lost (Department of Livestock) 
• More than 5,000 miles of roads and railways have been washed away83 
 
Figure 16.   Flood Affected Districts84 
                                                 
83 MCEER, “Pakistan Floods 2010: Latest Facts, News, Photos & Maps,” No Author. Accessed 27 
March 2011. Available http://mceer.buffalo.edu/infoservice/disasters/pakistan-floods-2010.asp.  
84 Data provided by Head of Chancery at Embassy of Pakistan, Washington DC during meeting on 24 
February 2011.  
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Figure 17.   Pakistan Floods: Map and Graphics85 
A summary of damages to provinces is shown in Table 4: 




KPK 1,156 1,198 284,990 3,800,000 
PUNJAB 110 262 497,700 8,200,000 
SIND 411 1,235 876,194 7,356,550 
BAL 54 104 75261 700,000 
AJK 71 87 7108 200,000 
GB 183 60 2820 100,000 
TOTAL 1,985 2,946 1,744,471 20,184,550 
Table 4.   Province wise Summary of Damages/Losses86 
                                                 
85 BBC News, “Pakistan Floods : Maps and Graphics,” No Author, updated 16 August 2010. Accessed 
27 March 2011. Available http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10986220.   
86 NDMA Pakistan, “Pakistan Floods-Summary of Damages.” 
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Figure 18.   Province wise Comparison of Losses87 
The World Bank and Asian Development Bank did an initial Damage Needs 
Assessment (DNA) and estimated the direct damage caused by floods to be US$6.5 
billion while indirect losses amount to US$3.6 billion. The agriculture, livestock, and 
fisheries sector suffered the highest damages. The estimate of total damage costs by 
sector is shown in Table 5.  The estimated overall recovery and reconstruction cost 
associated with the floods was at approximately US$8.74 – 10.85 billion, which included 
estimated costs for relief, early recovery, and medium to long term reconstruction. The 
cost for relief was estimated to be US$928 million, for early recovery US$956 million, 
and for reconstruction US$6,799 – 8,915 million.88 
                                                 
87 Data provided by Head of Chancery at Embassy of Pakistan, Washington DC during meeting on 24 
February 2011. 
88 Reliefweb, “Pakistan Floods 2010: Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment,” No Author, p.13. 





Table 5.   Estimate of Total Damage Costs by Sector 
The full extent of the damage caused by floods still cannot be completely 
quantified and assessments are ongoing. The direct and future losses are likely to affect 
millions of people at the household level, as well as impact national productive capacity.  
2. Temporal Analysis of Flooded Districts 
Temporal Analysis of Flooded Districts from July 30, 2010 to September 13, 
2010 is shown in Figure 19.89 
                                                 
89 HumanitarianResponse Pakistan, “Pakistan-Revised Floods Emergency Response Plan,” No Author, 




Figure 19.   Temporal Analysis of Flooded Districts 
3. Comparing Pre- and Post-disaster Images 
The satellite images in Figure 20 show how the Pakistan flood waters have 
swollen the lower Indus River, completely filling the river valley, when compared with 
images of the same area before the floods hit those areas. The flow through the Barrages  
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has exceeded the limit of water for, which these are designed.90,91 Figures 21 – 23 show 
before and after pictures of flooding at a few Barrages.  Figures 24 and 25 show some 
other places before and after river flooding. 
 
Figure 20.   Comparing Satellite Images of Indus River Flooding 
                                                 
90 BBC News, “Pakistan Floods : Maps and Graphics,” No Author, updated 16 August 2010. Accessed 
27 March 2011. Available http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10986220. 




Figure 21.   Taunsa Barrage (Left: Pre-flood on July 11, 2010; Right: Post-flood on 
August 12, 2010) 
 
Figure 22.   Sukkur Barrage (Left: Pre-flood on May 16, 2010; Right: Post-flood on 
August 13, 2010) 
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Figure 23.   Guddu Barrage (Left: Pre-flood on June 2, 2010; Right: Post-flood on 
August 12, 2010) 
 




Figure 25.   Rajanpur (Left: Pre-flood on June 1, 2010; Right: Post-flood on August 12, 
2010) 
Figures 26 – 28 are some of the pictures showing the gruesome situation on the 
ground after the floods hit different parts of the country.92 
 
Figure 26.   A Flooded Village and a Factory  
                                                 
92 NDMA Pakistan, “Pakistan Floods-Summary of Damages.” 
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Figure 27.   UN Secretary General Ban Key Moon’s Visit to Flood Affected Areas 
 
Figure 28.   Pakistan Military Engaged in Rescue and Relief Work 
C. NATURE OF RESPONSE FROM WITHIN THE COUNTRY 
1. Role of the Civil Government 
After suffering from a massive earthquake in 2005, the government of Pakistan 
established comprehensive organization at the federal, provincial and district levels to 
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help reduce effects of any disaster and take control of the situation in case of any disaster.  
The leading authority is the National Disaster Management Commission, which is headed 
by the Prime Minister, followed by the National Disaster Management Authority 
(NDMA) headed by a retired army Lieutenant General, Provincial Disaster Management 
Authorities (PDMAs) and District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs). Disaster 
Risk Management (DRM) in Pakistan is responsible for management of floods including 
preparedness, response/recovery and mitigation measures. The National Disaster 
Management Commission (NDMC) is to address the issues of disaster risk reduction and 
preparedness in a comprehensive manner. The National Disaster Management Authority 
(NDMA) has been tasked to implement the policies, strategies and programs for Disaster 
Risk Management developed by the NDMC, with a view to ensure reduction in disaster 
risks, and to enable the country to tackle any disaster in an organized and efficient 
manner.93 
In the case of the 2010 floods, NDMA was the lead authority in managing 
effective coordination among all the stake holders, which included federal government, 
provincial governments, both local and international NGOs, and other actors involved in 
the relief operations. It was also responsible for providing support and help in the 
distribution of relief goods such as food, blankets, tents, and tons of other items collected 
throughout the country to the affected people. Call centers were established to receive 
and respond to emergency calls. Simultaneous work was undertaken to strengthen banks 
vulnerable to floods. In some places, breaches were engineered to control floods and 
disrupted communication networks were quickly restored by temporary structures. 
In a relatively short span of time, considering the scale of disaster, the situation 
has fairly normalized. Currently, only 236,889 acres of land is submerged and a majority 
of the affected population living in the relief camps has returned to their homes. 
Repatriation of people in Punjab, Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (KPK), Azad Jammu and 
Kashmir (AJ&K) and Gilgit Biltistan (GB) provinces is 100%, whereas in Sindh it is 
                                                 
93 National HEPRN, Ministry of Health Website, “GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN: National Health 
Emergency Preparedness and Response Network,” No Author. Accessed 28 March 2011. Available 
http://www.nhepr.org/index.php?id=4. 
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95% and in Baluchistan it is 84%. In aggregate, there were a total of 5,928 camps 
housing more than 3 million affected people; but presently only 115 camps are left with 
only 123,008 people living in  them with a 96% aggregate repatriation ratio.94  The state 
of these relief camps is shown in Figure 29. 
 
Figure 29.   State of Relief Camps 
To provide relief to the people and help them settle and restart their businesses, 
government introduced the Watan card scheme. Under this scheme, the displaced people 
were registered by National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) and issued 
Watan debit cards, valued at approximately $230 each, in phases depending on the 
availability of funds for disbursement. In the Punjab province a total of 608,824 Watan 
cards have been processed and an amount of Rs. 11,966,034,234 have been disbursed; in 
Sindh 553,096 Watan cards have been processed with a total of Rs. 10,086,363,450 
disbursed; in KPK 198,408 Watan cards have been processed and Rs. 3,845,856,591 have 
been disbursed; in Baluchistan 101,700 Watan cards have been processed and Rs. 
1,811,622,486 have been disbursed; in AJ&K 9,961 Watan cards have been processed 
                                                 
94 NDMA, “News Room,” No Author, 12 February 2011. Accessed 29 March 2011. Available 
http://www.ndma.gov.pk/news_room.html. 
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and Rs. 185,412,500 have been disbursed; and in Gilgit Baltistan 3,258 Watan cards have 
been processed and Rs. 61,216,000 have been disbursed. In this regard, a total of 
1,475,247 Watan Cards have been processed and a total amount of Rs. 27,956,505,262 
(approximately $32.7 million) has been disbursed among the affected.95 
No major outbreak of any epidemic was reported in any part of the country. 
However, four major diseases were reported in the affected areas: ARI (Acute 
Respiratory Infections), skin diseases, acute diarrhea, and suspected malaria. At the peak, 
33% cases of ARI were reported while currently the rate has gone down to 31%; skin 
disease cases reported were 12% while by February 2011 it has come down to 9%; acute 
diarrhea cases initially reported were 12%, which have also reduced to 6%; and suspected 
malaria cases have reduced from initial reports of 7% to 5% only. These figures indicate 
an improvement in the health scenario in the flood hit areas.96 
Around 80 percent of people in the affected areas depend on agriculture to 
provide for their families. A large majority lost their immediate and future sources of 
food and income, such as standing crops, seed stocks, livestock, fishery assets, farming 
equipment and tools. The Rabi cropping (the crops that are sown in the winter season) for 
the year 2010/11 is 1 – 2 % higher than the targets. In the flood affected districts, the 
Rabi coverage is 60 – 100% than that of the preceding year.97 
2. Role of Pakistan Armed Forces 
Pakistan armed forces were the main tool available to the federal government to 
be employed in rescue and relief works. In spite of the fact that half of the Pakistan Army 
remained committed to combat terrorists, over 60,000 troops were committed for the 
rescue and relief activities throughout the affected areas. The Pakistan Navy and Air 
Force also contributed proportionately in the rescue and relief operation. The armed 
forces of Pakistan had been the most effective, organized and committed element of the 
                                                 





government to undertake the rescue and relief operation. They were able to manage the 
relief and rescue work in an efficient manner and were appreciated by the affected 
people, national political and government leadership, international donors, NGOs, and 
media.98  
Some of the armed forces’ contributions in the flood relief and rescue campaign 
are highlighted below:99 
• 68,000 tons of rations were collected and distributed, including 2,300 tons 
of rations from the Army’s own quota. 
• 60,000 Army troops were employed in rescue and relief operations. 
• Fifty two helicopters were used for transporting critical relief supplies to 
cut off areas. 
• Over one hundred Army Relief Camps were established across the 
country. 
• Around 1.4 million people were rescued. 
• 1,500,000 (1.5 M) packets of cooked food were distributed to the affected 
people. 
• More than 1,000 boats including navy hovercrafts and other vessels were 
used in the rescue operations. 
• Pakistan Armed Forces personnel donated their salary for one day to flood 
affected people. 
• The Army’s veterinary mobile teams were deployed for vaccinating 
animals in the affected areas to save their lives. 
• Pakistan Navy marines rescued around 223,000 personnel. The Navy 
established five relief camps with a medical camp and an elementary 
school being integral components, and medical treatment was provided to 
46,378 people. The Navy distributed 1,145 tons of rations and also 
                                                 
98 Raja Muhammad Khan, “The Role of armed forces during floods,” The NEWS, 10 September 2010. 
Accessed 5 April 2011. Available 
http://thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=4084&Cat=2&dt=9/11/2010.  
99 ISPR, “Pakistan Army’s Flood Relief Efforts,” No Author. Accessed 5 April 2011.Available 
http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-real_story&id=16&search=1. 
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constructed a model village comprising forty houses and has further plans 
to construct more such villages.100 
• Pakistan Air Force dedicated all its C-130s for the transportation of relief 
goods and evacuation of personnel from affected areas. 
3. Role of the Civil Society 
During the disaster the civil society in Pakistan acted very swiftly and tried to 
reach each and every part of the affected area. Political parties and humanitarian relief 
organizations joined hands with the government in establishing relief camps for displaced 
people, providing them clean drinking water, food, milk for kids, wood for cooking, 
medicines, tents, clothing and other items of necessity. They had also been engaged in 
providing seeds, fertilizer and other equipment to farmers so they can start their business.  
Youth organizations were engaged in collecting donations for flood affected people and 
were able to collect a good amount of cash as well as relief goods like blankets, food 
items, and clothing.101 These organizations and volunteer groups were able to help 
hundreds of thousands of flood victims with different food items, medical treatment 
through free medical camps, hygiene kits (including soap, towels, surf, sanitary pads, 
women undergarments, etc.), kitchen sets (crockery, water cans), temporary toilets, filter 
units to clean water, stoves for cooking, dry milk, biscuits, grains, oil, sugar, vaccinations 
for water borne diseases, beds, feeders and pampers for children, candles, water 
purification sachets, tea, spices, rice bags, and tons of other items, which were needed.102 
In addition, some NGOs established child friendly and female friendly areas as a comfort 
haven for children and women to interact among themselves. The private  
 
 
                                                 
100 Pakistan Navy, “Pakistan Navy Rehabilitation Efforts Floods 2010,” No Author. Accessed 5 April 
2011. Available http://www.paknavy.gov.pk/rehab.htm. 
101 Waleed Tariq, “Civil Society takes charge of flood relief work,” Pakistan Eye, 7 September 2010. 
Accessed 5 April 2011. Available http://local.citizenseye.com/pakistan/2010/09/civil-society-takes-charge-
of-flood-relief/. 
102 Pakistanflood.org, “Pakistan Flood: Member Associates of FPCCI- Flood Relief Activities,” No 
Author. Accessed 5 April 2011. Available http://www.pakistanflood.org/category/organizations-on-the-
ground/on-ground-needs/. 
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sector, which includes  individuals, corporations and foundations, contributed over 
US$17 million to the flood relief effort, with the majority of the funds passed on to 
various UN organizations and NGOs.103 
D. RESPONSE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
1. Response by the United Nations and the International Community 
Response from the international community was very slow in the beginning and 
only $3.20 was committed per flood affected person within ten days of the disaster, as 
compared to $70 committed per person within ten days of the Pakistan earthquake and 
$495 per person within ten days of the Haiti earthquake.104 Figure 30 shows per capita 
assistance within the first 10 days of crises.  As the effects of the floods became evident, 
the international community started to respond more seriously. There were approximately 
2,500 international troops deployed in support of the relief efforts, and financial and 
technical assistance to the Government of Pakistan (GoP) was also offered by a number 
of countries. 
In August 2010, the UN launched an initial appeal for US$459.7 million to 
finance Pakistan's Initial Flood Emergency Response Plan. This was followed by the 
September 17, 2010 launch of the UN’s largest ever humanitarian appeal for US$2.07 
billion to finance projects supporting essential sectors such as shelter, food, water, 
sanitation, hygiene, and agriculture for a period of twelve months.105 UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki moon visited the flood affected areas of Pakistan in August 2010, 
followed by a number of other high ranking UN officials such as The Emergency Relief 
Coordinator, Executive Director of the World Food Program (WFP), the United Nations 
                                                 
103 Reliefweb, “Pakistan Floods 2010: Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment,” No Author, p.20. 
Accessed 2 April 2011. Available 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/MUMA-8B68ST-
full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf. 
104 Data provided by HOC at Embassy of Pakistan, Washington DC during meeting on 24 February 
2011.  
105 UN News Centre, “Pakistan: UN issues largest-ever disaster appeal at over $2 billion for flood 
victims,” No Author, 17 September 2010. Accessed 28 March 2011. Available 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=35983&Cr=pakistan&Cr1=. 
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High Commissioner for Refugees, Directors General of the World Health Organization 
(WHO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to show 
solidarity and commitment to the disaster.106 
Pledges from sixty eight bilateral and multilateral donors totaling US 1.87 billion 
in the form of grants and in kind contributions were committed by October 2010 to the 
government for the relief and early recovery phases.107 
 
Figure 30.   Per Capita Assistance Ten Days into Crises108 
As of April 5, 2011, 67% of funding amounting to $1,306,514,859 against the 
required amount of $1,963,473,246 has been received against Pakistan Floods Relief and 
                                                 
106 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Secretary General,” Strengthening emergency 
relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and prevention in the wake of devastating floods in Pakistan,” No 
Author, 7 March 2011. Accessed 9 April 2011. Available 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/65/773. 
107 Reliefweb, “Pakistan Floods 2010: Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment,” No Author, p.20. 
Accessed 2 April 2011. Available 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/MUMA-8B68ST-
full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf. 
108 Data provided by HOC at Embassy of Pakistan, Washington DC during meeting on 24 February 
2011. 
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Early Recovery Response Plan 2010, and still 33% amounting to $653,958,387 are 
unmet.109 In Pakistan, Humanitarian Response Plan funding received as of April 5, 2011 
is approximately 50%, amounting to $330,088,035 against the requirement of 
$661,180,978, and $331,092,943 are still unmet.110 An amount of $36,635,196 has been 
donated in the Emergency Response Fund for Pakistan by different countries to fill 
critical funding gaps and to ensure most urgent actions have enough resources at the 
onset of crises. Around US$29 million had been allocated to one hundred projects 
including those in flood affected provinces.111 
As of April 5, 2011, funding outside the appeal like bilateral aid programs, private 
donations, in kind donations and funding to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement had surpassed US$1.1 billion.112 
As of January 31, 2011, approximately six million people had received food 
assistance in monthly rations, over 385,000 metric tons of food was distributed, 9.3 
million people had essential medication needs covered, medical attention had been 
provided to nearly 10 million people, and almost 900,000 households had been provided 
with emergency shelter. Access to safe water was provided through rehabilitated water 
systems for 4.7 million people and through water trucking to 4.57 million people. 
Countrywide, the nutrition cluster reported that over 750,000 children under age five had 
been screened and 31,000 severely malnourished children and about 70,000 moderately 
malnourished children had been admitted into therapeutic programs or feeding programs, 
while 39,000 pregnant and lactating women were admitted into the supplementary 
feeding programs across the country. The logistics cluster had processed 80,000 cubic 
meters of relief cargo, and over 11,900 metric tons of relief cargo had been airlifted. 
                                                 






Temporary learning centers provided education to more than 220,000 children (including 
96,000 girls) and more than 400,000 children were enrolled in child friendly spaces.113 
The summary of the total funding status of countries/organizations’ commitments 
and pledges in the form of cash donations and relief goods for different clusters as 
appealed by the United Nations is appended in Table 6. The table provides a summary of 
total funding status as of April 5, 2011.114  
Total Commitment  $3042 million 
Cash Committed Pipeline $1618.86 million 
 Disbursed $475.78 million 
Soft Loans Committed $243.00 million 
 Disbursed 0.00 
In Kind Committed Pipeline $539.87 million 
 Delivered $185.11 million 
Implementing Agency 
wise total commitment 
UN/INGOs $2346.10 million 
 GoP $696.64 million 
Table 6.   Status of Funding by Countries/Organizations 
2. U.S. Assistance 
The U.S. has been the major contributor so far and has provided around 29% of 
all assistance delivered to Pakistan. The U.S. is providing $571.6 million through 
different channels, such as $305M through USAID/OFDA, $141M through USAID/FFP, 
$10M through USAID/Pakistan Assistance (KLB), $70M through Pakistan Early 
Recovery Assistance and $49M through State Assistance.115 There were several 
                                                 
113 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Secretary General,” Strengthening emergency 
relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and prevention in the wake of devastating floods in Pakistan,” No 
Author, 7 March 2011. Accessed 9 April 2011. Available 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/65/773. 
114 Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Economics and Statistics, “Country wise update of Foreign 








USAID/OFDA funded international and UN organizations engaged in the relief 
operations, and also USAID/OFDA NGO grantees have expanded relief activities further 
into affected areas. The U.S. has provided other civilian and military in kind assistance in 
the form of halal meals, prefabricated steel bridges and other infrastructure support, as 
well as air support to and within Pakistan to transport goods and rescue people, valued at 
approximately $20 million.116 The U.S. also provided thirteen mobile water treatment 
units, each with the capability to produce enough clean water for 20,000 people a day; 
twelve 12,000 liter water bladders for the storage of clean water; 208,750 x 10 liter water 
containers; 15 million water purification tablets (sufficient to chlorinate 150 million liters 
of water); 58 Zodiac inflatable rescue boats; 96 concrete saws and saw blades; 237,005 
blankets; and 12,113 rolls of plastic sheeting for the construction of temporary shelters. 
The USS Peleliu was tasked to support the Pakistani government as needed and provided 
additional heavy air lift capability in the form of two CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters. 
A total of nineteen helicopters were provided for humanitarian relief efforts to operate in 
partnership with Pakistan military throughout the flood impacted areas.117 By the end of 
operations, U.S. helicopters flew more than 26 million pounds of relief supplies and 
rescued more than 40,000 people. In addition to the humanitarian airlift assistance, U.S. 
monetary aid for flood relief has topped half a billion dollars.118 
                                                 
116 Data provided by HOC at Embassy of Pakistan, Washington DC during meeting on 24 February 
2011.  
117 NAVY.mil, “Helicopters Launch from USS Peleliu in Support of Pakistan Relief Efforts,” No 
Author, 12 August 2010. Accessed 27 March 2011. Available 
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=55268. 
118 Embassy of The United States of America at Islamabad, Pakistan Website, Press release, No 
Author, 2 December 2010. Accessed 27 March 2011. Available http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr-
10120201.html.  
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E. FACTS ABOUT PAKISTAN’S EARTHQUAKE IN 2005 
 
On October 8, 2005, at 08:50:40 AM a powerful earthquake of magnitude 7.6 hit 
the northern part of Pakistan with its epicenter at latitude 34° 29' 35N and longitude 73° 
37' 44E, a distance about 19 km (11.8 miles) northeast of Muzaffarabad, AJ&K 
(Pakistan), and 100 km (65 miles) north northeast of Islamabad (Pakistan). The 
hypocenter was located at a depth of 26 km (16.2 miles) below the surface, causing major 
destruction and wreaking havoc on hundreds of thousands of lives. It covered a total area 
of around 30,000 sq. km. Five districts of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (Muzaffarabad, 
Bagh, Poonch, Rawalakot and Neelam) and five districts of NWFP (Mansehra, 
Battagram, Kohistan, Abbotabad and Shangla) were the most badly affected with damage 
on a massive scale. But the impact was felt as far away as Islamabad and the northern 
parts of Punjab. The 11 story Margalla Towers Apartment Complex in the capital city of 
Islamabad collapsed, killing dozens of residents.  
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Figure 31.   Epicenter and Areas Affected by the 2005 Earthquake 
More than 73,000 people lost their lives and another 128,309 people were injured. 
Table 7 provides a listing of the number of deaths and injuries incurred. Almost 600,000 
homes were destroyed, which rendered 3.5 million people homeless; 6,000 schools and 
colleges were destroyed and 35,000 children were killed who were attending classes at 
that time, and over 73% of the total 574 health facilities were destroyed. There was also 
extensive destruction and damage caused to other infrastructures such as roads, water 
pipes (one third of the primary roads in AJK and NWFP, now KPK, were affected), 
sanitation facilities, power supplies, telecommunications and other amenities. Table 8 
provides the totals of such losses. Dozens of landslides blocked rivers and springs, 
destroyed woodland and caused environmental damage as well. Civil administration in 
the quake hit areas was seriously eroded as government buildings were destroyed, killing 
thousands of government personnel. Army barracks and regiments present in NWFP 
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(now KPK) and Azad Kashmir (AJ&K) were also decimated.119  The earthquake also did 
some damage in Afghanistan and northern India and killed number of people, injured 
many and caused other damages as well, but the effects were insignificant in comparison 
to Pakistan. There have been many secondary earthquakes in the region, mainly to the 
northwest of the original epicenter. On the first day after the initial massive quake 147 
aftershocks were registered, one of that had a magnitude of 6.2 (a tremor of magnitude 
six is rated as a "strong" earthquake). Twenty eight aftershocks occurred with a 
magnitude greater than five during four days after the principal quake, and even eleven 
days after the big one there were still considerable shocks.120  
Area Dead Injured 
Muzaffarabad 34,173 56,526 
Mansehra  24,511 35,306 
Bagh 8,157  24,000 
Battagram 3,232  3,279 
Rawalakot 1,078  2,021 
Kohistan 661  2,000 
Abbotabad 515  2,500 
Army (AJK 456  766 
Shangla 423  957 
Islamabad 74  101 
Others 58  853 
 TOTAL 73,338  128,309 
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Pre-Quake Total % of Total Destroyed Population Affected 
(mn) 
600,152 787,583 76.2% 3.5 
Schools and Colleges 
 Destroyed/Damaged Pre-Quake Total % 
Destroyed/Damaged 
AJK 3,685 3,879 95% 
PKP/NWFP 3,984 7,577 53% 
Total 7,669 11,456 66.94% 
Health Care Facilities 
Destroyed/Damaged Pre-Quake Total % Destroyed/Damaged 
574 782 73.4% 
Roads: Length Affected/Total Length (km) 
 Damaged Pre-Quake Total % Total 
AJK 2,366 5,305 45% 
PKP/NWFP 2,063 6,658 %31 
Total 4,429 11,963 37.02% 
Telecommunications 
 Exchanges Lines 
 Installed Disrupted Installed Disrupted 
AJK (SCO) 132 48 134,841 114,404 
PKP/NWFP 
(PTCL) 
119 38 20,294 12,902 
Total 251 86 249,245 34,196 
Table 8.   Earthquake Damage: Physical Toll122 
F. NATURE OF RESPONSE TO THE EARTHQUAKE 
1. Government Response 
When the earthquake occurred in Pakistan in 2005, the country did not have a 
central disaster management body, so the first step taken was the establishment of Federal 
Relief Commission (FRC) to manage and coordinate the entire relief effort. It was 
comprised of two wings, civilian and a military, each headed by a chief coordinator. The 
role of the civilian wing was to ensure effective coordination and inter agency 
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cooperation. The military wing was primarily responsible for all rescue and relief 
operations and was comprised of a Relief Planning Cell, Relief Operations Cell, 
Information Management Cell, Air Liaison Cell, and Foreign Collaboration Cell. 
Provincial Relief Commissioners were also appointed to ensure proper implementation of 
the FRC’s policies, coordinate relief efforts with the federal government, and identify and 
highlight priority areas or issues for aid agencies to be addressed.123  
 
Figure 32.   Organizational Structure of the Federal Relief Commission 
The FRC’s main focus was primarily on rescue and relief. Their main priorities 
were the rescue of trapped survivors; medical treatment of the injured; provision of food 
and water to survivors; provision of emergency shelter, clothing and bedding; restoration 
of communications and access to remote areas; damage control and maintenance of law 
and order; and support to local capacities and efforts. The Earthquake Relief and 
Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) was established later on for overseeing further relief 
operations and rehabilitation of the affected people and affected areas and FRC was 
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merged into it.  The Armed Forces of Pakistan, various Ministries, Utility Stores 
Corporation (USC), PTCL, SCO, WAPDA, NLC and the Cabinet Division’s Emergency 
Relief Cell were critically involved in the relief operations. The Pakistan Army, being 
more organized and equipped, was in the forefront of search, rescue and evacuation 
operations and the provision of emergency relief supplies. PAF coordinated all air 
operations and dedicated all air assets for transportation of goods to affected areas. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) coordinated with foreign governments for funding 
and diplomatic teams to visit the region. The Emergency Relief Cell had the very 
important task of purchasing relief goods.124  
The Utility Stores Corporation (USC) of Pakistan opened thirty three 
containerized outlets in the affected areas and distributed over 15,000 tons of rations. Its 
contribution included a supply of 73,610 bags of composite rations between October 9 
and November 14, 2005, provision and transport of seven days’ reserve stocks for 1.5 
million people (10,354 tons), distribution of 1,500 tons of rations to people short of food, 
and provision of CGI sheets to people in the affected areas at subsidized rates.125 
Military aircraft began dropping supplies into the quake zone just after the 
earthquake, and that was the largest air operation in the history of relief operations. Army 
Engineers, Special Communications Organization (SCO) and Signal Corps resources 
were mobilized to restore communications in the affected areas and reopen the main 
supply routes. Due to their concerted efforts, the three main arteries for road traffic to the 
affected areas were opened for light traffic within 24 – 36 hours and for heavy traffic 
within 72 hours. Thereafter simultaneous movements of goods by land also began, in 
which over 50,000 troops participated.126 
Helicopters and C-130s were extensively used for transportation of relief goods to 
the affected areas. Total of 129 helicopters (73 provided by international community and 
56 domestic) conducted about 28,639 sorties, transported around 6,000 tons of relief 
                                                 




goods/rations to the forward areas, and evacuated around 17,150 causalities. The Air 
Force carried out 491 sorties to move goods from Karachi to Islamabad and dropped 
them into the affected areas, and evacuated more than 129,000 injured people. The Air 
Liaison Cell of the FRC also arranged fifty one visits by civil and military dignitaries to 
the affected areas to apprise them of the scale of destruction and efforts needed in the 
relief and rehabilitation process.127 
Item Quantity 
Tents 950,440 
Blankets 6.5 million 
Ration 256,400 tons 
Miscellaneous Items 131,000 tons 
Medicines 3,054 tons 
K-2 Oil 2 million liters 
Compensation Paid Rs. 22 billion 
Table 9.   Relief Goods Provided by the end of March 2006 
All Combined Military Hospitals (CMHs) in the vicinity were immediately put on 
high alert to prepare to receive casualties. CMHs and Army Hospitals in the affected 
areas were also destroyed, but those outside of the affected area played a major role in the 
treatment of earthquake survivors. The Army played a key role in the supply and 
management of medicines and other items, which were sent by the FRC along with other 
relief goods.128 
Around 153 relief camps were established, which included both planned as well 
as spontaneous camps, throughout the affected area; at one point some 200,000 internally 
displaced people were receiving assistance in those camps. A summary of total goods 
provided to the affected people through March 2006 is provided in Table 9.129  
                                                 




2. Response from the Pakistani Public 
The public response to the earthquake was unprecedented and people from all 
walks of life came forward to help their country mates through monetary donations, 
supplies of relief goods, and a great number volunteered their services to help the quake 
survivors. Tens of thousands of quilts, items of clothing, stoves, heaters, food rations and 
other goods were donated from all over the country. Within hours and days many 
national and international teams of medical experts and other volunteers started arriving 
in the quake affected areas, bringing with them a range of medical and non medical 
supplies. They brought about a huge increase in local capacity to deal with the large 
numbers of casualties. All fields of media, such as TV, the press, celebrities, and the 
fashion industry, carried programs and special events to raise awareness of the plight of 
the quake survivors and raise donations and other resources for them. About 23% of total 
food rations and 2.2 million quilts (36% of the total) were donated by the government and 
people of the Punjab province. People of the province of Sindh were equally helpful, with 
huge quantities of relief supplies collected at Karachi and other cities. These were sent to 
the FRC by air, rail and road for distribution to the affected people.130 
The Pakistani diaspora in the UK, U.S. and other countries also participated in the 
relief operation very actively and generously. They donated tons of relief goods and 
many even travelled to Pakistan for participation in the relief efforts.131  
3. Response from the International Community 
The international community also responded generously and a total of sixty eight 
countries sent supplies to help the earthquake affected people. The significant 
contributions were:132 
                                                 




• Turkey donated 55,000 tons of rations, over 1 million blankets, 9,000 
tents, nine field hospitals, 114 tons of medicines, two tent villages catering 
around 5,000 people and also large cash donations. 
• Sri Lanka donated 3,000 tons of rations. 
• China provided 210,880 blankets, 14,000 tents, sixty four tons of 
medicines, and sent a 50 member rescue team with sniffer dogs to rescue 
survivors. 
• Saudi Arabia provided hundreds of thousands of blankets, quilts, stoves, 
food packages, tons of dates, medicines, thousands of winterized 
waterproof tents, thousands of polypropylene sheets and more than $500 
million to help revive the normal life of earthquake victims.  
• Japan sent 120 rescue workers, set up a field hospital and provided heavy 
machinery to clear rubble (ten excavators and ten bulldozer cranes). 
• The U.S. provided 189,827 blankets, set up two MASH hospitals and 
provided 159 tons of medicines. The U.S. Army provided an engineering 
detachment (SEABEES) comprising 116 people. They brought with them 
fifteen plant pieces and a number of generator sets. The company 
commenced work in the first week of November, and was replaced by 
forty personnel in December 2005. On departure, the company handed 
over twenty five plant pieces to Pakistani engineers to use in rescue and 
relief operations. The U.S. Army also provided twenty four helicopters.   
• Germany sent a search and rescue team. 
• Cuba made a particularly big contribution to health care for the survivors, 
sending 2,575 medical personnel who set up thirty field hospitals and 
formed fifteen medical teams. A total of 1.3 million out patients attended 
the facilities, 7,768 were admitted, 12,406 operations were performed, and 
100,000 patients were given physiotherapy. 
• Iran provided two helicopters to support the relief effort and twenty two 
vehicles (fifteen ambulances, four buses, two vans, one jeep). It also set up 
two 50 bed field hospitals and gave four tons of medicines. 
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• The ICRC carried out its own needs assessment and launched its 
independent, self contained relief operation. It chartered eight helicopters, 
which flew 8,000 sorties and distributed 12,791 tons of food and 1,275 
tons of non food items. 
• NATO provided NATO Response Force-5 (NRF-5), which was comprised 
of NATO field hospitals (manned by the Dutch), NATO engineers 
(Italian), and Spanish, Polish, British and Lithuanian engineer assets. The 
NATO field hospitals treated 7,490 patients and a further 9,724 via mobile 
medical teams, and carried out 2,300 immunizations. NATO engineers 
removed 41,500 m3 of debris at twelve major sites, carried out repairs on 
59 km of roads at three locations, constructed twenty retaining walls, built 
110 high altitude structures, and deployed eight water purification plants. 
NRF-5 also set up thirteen tent schools. NATO also provided six 
helicopters and they carried 1,740 tons of relief goods to the affected areas 
as well as evacuated 7,750 displaced/sick/injured people.133 
4. UN Response 
Pakistan requested UN support on the afternoon of October 8, 2005, and members 
of UNDAC arrived the following morning. The UNDAC team’s initial tasks were 
critical. With support from Pakistani officials and the UN Country Office, it was possible 
to immediately set up an onsite coordination centre in Muzaffarabad, as well as an 
international reception centre at Islamabad Airport and a functioning coordination hub in 
Islamabad. Within the first two weeks it was able to establish Humanitarian Hubs in 
Bagh, Batagram, Mansehra, as well as Muzaffarabad. Cluster leads were appointed and 
the lead agencies appointed individuals to lead the process of gathering data, projections 
and project proposals and submitting cost proposals for consolidation in the Flash 
Appeal, which was subsequently launched for $266 million.134 
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A cluster approach was applied for the entire earthquake disaster response. The 
idea was discussed with the FRC, who approved the cluster approach and nominated 
focal persons for each cluster within the FRC. The clusters were: emergency shelter, 
protection, water and sanitation, education, IT/communications, logistics, nutrition, 
health, camp management, and early recovery and reconstruction. UNDP was cluster lead 
for early recovery, WFP for nutrition, IOM for emergency shelter, and so on.135 
One week following the UN Flash Appeal hardly any funds had come in. The 
UNHCR had expended almost all its emergency funds, as had UNICEF, WHO, other 
major organizations in the UN System, as well as the key international organizations. An 
‘80:20 strategy’ was then adapted in which the Pakistan military would deliver roughly 
80% of relief goods and humanitarian agencies 20%, and parallel efforts were also made 
to mobilize funds. In conjunction with the UN’s Emergency Relief Coordinator, the 
Resident Coordinator initiated an aggressive media strategy to raise awareness of the 
funding situation. A revised Flash Appeal was issued, based on new information and 
assessments, which raised the estimated cost of the relief operation to US$560 million. 
Thanks to these efforts, money did begin to come in just in time. In November 2005, the 
International Donors’ Conference was held in Islamabad and pledges of around $5.87 
billion were made for funding various reconstruction activities and also funds were 
provided by the government and different NGOs.136 
The UN had a health cluster for that the lead was assigned to the World Health 
Organization (WHO). This cluster coordinated medical evacuation services, international 
medical teams, supply of medicines, establishment of mobile clinics and field hospitals, 
and other assistance provided by donor agencies and the international community. The 
health cluster also worked closely with government agencies to ensure that all assistance 
supplemented Pakistani initiatives and the overall strategy laid down for health care. 
Immunization against infectious diseases including cholera, typhoid, measles and tetanus 
was carried out by Expanded Program of Immunization (EPI) teams of the MoH, WHO, 
UNICEF, Aga Khan Foundation and AMC units. The goal was to achieve 90 – 100% 
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vaccination of the populations in the tent villages. Tetanus was a particular concern 
because of the number of injuries, and urgent arrangements were made for vaccines, as 
these were initially in short supply. In addition, MSF (France) established a 20 bed 
hospital at Mansehra for tetanus patients. AMC and MoH teams also sprayed insecticide 
in affected areas to control the spread of disease. UN organizations also provided 
seventeen helicopters.137 The UN response was swift, focused and determined and that 
helped the government of Pakistan in relief operations and is still helping it in the 
rehabilitation process as a number of projects are currently ongoing. 
5. Response from International and Local NGOs 
Prior to the 2005 earthquake, some thirty four international NGOs (INGOs) were 
operating in Pakistan. After the earthquake many more came into the country and INGOs 
were joined by many domestic NGOs. A total of 140 NGOs were formally registered 
with the FRC, but there were hundreds more small scale and/or local level NGOs who 
participated in the relief effort. These NGOs provided rations, medicines, blankets and 
clothing, tents, stoves, and much more to the affected people. Donor agencies and NGOs 
were in fact the main providers of CGI sheets for the construction of semi permanent 
shelters, in fact 175,000 shelters out of the total of 370,000 shelters were constructed 
using CGI sheets donated by these NGOs and donors, which helped people to survive the 
harsh winters and averted the need for a mass migration out of the affected areas. Support 
in terms of services included volunteers to help in rubble clearance and rescue work, 
distribution of goods, construction of shelters, and medical personnel to provide 
treatment to the survivors138. 
G. MODERN TOOLS USED DURING THE 2010 FLOODS 
The Pakistan floods in 2010, despite their gravity, did not mobilize volunteer 
technical communities to the same extent Haiti had done six months prior. Many of the 
modern tools that were used successfully in Haiti were also used in Pakistan flood relief 
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operations, but their application was limited and did not prove that successful. This 
failure was contributed to Pakistan’s technological infrastructure because the level of 
mobile phone adoption in the flooded areas was very poor, and the non availability of 
satellite imagery of the country made it so the volunteer developers struggled in plotting 
where relief was a priority.139 Following are some of the modern tools used by local and 
international relief organizations during the flood relief operation. 
1. FloodMAPS 
It is local website tool created by Mr. Sohaib Khan, a computer science professor 
at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), and sponsored by the provincial 
government of Punjab, SUPARCO and International Growth Centre (IGC). It relied on 
Google Earth and Google Maps to track the path of the flood and monitor devastation 
like washed out bridges that needed to be rebuilt, etc. These maps provided detailed 
views of thousands of villages affected by the downpour, broken down by region. The 
primary users of these maps were NGOs at work in Pakistan and also the Punjab 
government. The maps themselves track data provided by affiliated aid groups about 
damaged roads and other affected infrastructure.140 The FloodMAPS team was engaged 
in working with the Imran Khan Foundation (IKF), catering to their mapping needs. The 
IKF launched two initiatives simultaneously throughout the affected areas: the seeds 
distribution campaign (distribution of wheat seeds across the country) and a village 
development project (the construction of model villages in different flood affected areas). 
Both of these projects were mapped and the progress of both campaigns can now be 
viewed online.141 
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2. CrisisCommons 
CrisisCommons had a detailed Pakistan flood wiki going and it put together a 20 
hour CrisisCamp day on September 3 – 4, 2010 with problem definitions for exploration 
of solutions and recommendations related to the Pakistan floods. Anyone could provide 
written recommendations and ideas. Video submissions were also welcomed from groups 
or individuals. CrisisCommons seeks to advance and support the use of open data and 
volunteer technology communities to catalyze innovation in crisis management and 
global development.142 
3. HARMONIEweb 
It was an unclassified portal site for U.S. government and non government 
civilian aid workers and the military to exchange flood information. The links to most of 
the organizations involved in flood relief are given and anyone interested in helping out 
can request a HARMONIEweb account. Users can post their documents, announcements, 
calendar events, requests for assistance, and any other information they want to share. 
But HARMONIEweb didn’t seem to have worked very well during the disaster and failed 
in building up a sizable community.143 
4. Google Crises Response 
Google's tool, Google Person Finder, which is used to connect those seeking 
information about loved ones, and Google Resource Finder, which helps locate medical 
facilities and other emergency services during a crisis, were used to some extent during 
flood relief operations. Google joined the Pakistan flood relief campaign and opened 
donation links for different UN and other charity organizations.144  
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5. PakRelief Crowd Map, Pak Flood Incident Reporting System 
People with access to working mobile phones were asked to text a message to 
3441 and relay their first hand information about the nature of emergencies and the needs 
of people in a particular flood affected location. This information was then verified and 
mapped onto the CrisesMap. PakRelief would then notify a relief agency working nearby 
of that particular incident and the type of help required. The group is comprised of local 
and international collaborators with significant experience in global disaster 
coordination.145  
6. PakReport 
PakReport is a donor supported SMS effort established by Pakistani technologists 
and their mostly American academic friends. PakReport allowed people affected by the 
flood to send in their location and a message about their needs. Using the Ushahidi 
mapping tool, flood stricken Pakistanis could then find their emergency information 
tracked by type and location, giving officials and independent aid agencies a view into 
the evolving landscape of people’s needs. A text message to number 3441 was used to 
help create a distributed database of crisis information.146 
7. Humari Awaz 
This is a mobile phone based social networking channel, which was established 
with the help of the U.S. State Department. It is available to all cell phone operators in 
Pakistan. Through this network, one can create their own group and anyone can join it for 
free. The group founder can then send one SMS, which will automatically be sent to all 
the group followers. The purpose of establishing Humari Awaz was to build mobile based 
networks around shared interests, themes and subjects and to create social networks that 
facilitate more people to people interactions. A text SMS “HELP” or “MADAD” sent to 
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7111 helps the users to go through the registration process. During the flood relief 
operations, people were invited to use this tool to share information; update each other 
about the latest flood news, valuable NGO grants, and business opportunities; and to 
make new announcements of support by SMS texting the word FLOODS to 7111.147 
During the flood disaster this social networking tool didn’t seem to work very effectively, 
as most of the people in the affected area were unaware of any such network.  
8. Donor2Deed (D2D) 
Donor2Deed (D2D) is an integrated online fundraising and communications tool 
that uses geolocation services like Google Earth and Google Maps to connect donors 
directly to projects. It then automatically updates the donor on the progress of the project 
in a format (SMS, e-mail, etc.) and in a timeframe that the donor chooses. Donor2Deed 
has a Facebook and iPhone application and can also link to a Twitter 
account. Donor2Deed worked during the floods to map the Pakistan relief effort and 
provided this service free to charities to help them raise more money for the victims of 
the floods.148 
9. Social Networking Sites like Facebook and Twitter 
These sites helped the Pakistani community to be connected and to raise the voice 
for the help of flood victims throughout the world. They were able, to some extent, to  
mobilize people in different parts of the world to help the flood victims. Using Twitter 
also got different celebrities throughout the world to tweet their fans to help flood victims 
at Pakistan.   
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Sahana was one of the information management tools providing resources on the 
Pakistan flood response. It could provide the raw data, in various formats including on 
maps, and is built on an open source rapid application development framework and 
supported by a global community of volunteers. Therefore, new features can quickly be 
developed in response to changing requirements on the ground.149 
11. ReliefWeb 
This web site provided updates on the relief works, funding status, information on 
links to all agencies involved in the relief and recovery operations, UN appeals, situation 
reports and latest updates of disaster related events taking place around the globe.150 
12. LIVPOD 
The UNIGEO initiative for Pakistan provided extranet access to LIVPOD, a cloud 
computing service designed for sharing live notes on the ground, between the Emergency 
Relief teams and their different partners, using mobile devices such as smart 
phones/pads/laptops, etc. It provides them an easy way to upload their breaking news 
onto a common data server and, in return, get specific details and/or global views on the 
situation in terms of immediate needs, food availability, refugee camps management, 
logistics, etc. Small web maps for mobile use are automatically created through Google 
Maps or other API.151 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
A. EXPLANATION OF SELECTED VARIABLES 
The following potential variables were selected for comparative analysis of 
response by the international community in the HA/DR operations in the two chosen 
exemplar cases.  Each variable was assigned a weighting score ‘N’ according to its 
influence and significance on the response by the international community in HA/DR 
operations.  The effects of each variable on the response shown by the international 
community in the two exemplar cases (i.e., earthquake in Haiti and floods in Pakistan in 
2010) were explored.  The country, which had better response by the international 
community under influence of a particular variable was assigned the value ‘N+N/2’ and 
the other ‘N-N/2.’ The values assigned to each variable for both countries were then used 
to determine the cumulative response by the international community in each country.  
That led to the determination of whether the international community response in both 
the exemplar cases was equitable or not; and if not, what the reasons were for that 
difference and what should be done to improve it and make it equitable. 
1. Pre-existing Conditions in the Country  
The following pre-existing conditions were explored to determine the state of the 
each country before the disaster. 
a. Overall Political and Economic Conditions 
Haiti has been suffering from political unrest, human rights violations and 
disturbance for a very long time, and a UN peace keeping and stabilization force has been 
present in the country since 2004. It had been ruled by different dictators; however, the 
country was headed by a political leader at the time of disaster, but still the state of the 
government and the country was not very good. Haiti has been suffering from racial 
injustice and discrimination as the white minority has been holding most of the country’s 
wealth and had been suppressing the black Creole majority, which resulted in the 
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deteriorated law and order situation and increased crime rate.  Haiti’s economy was 
struggling. It depended heavily on agriculture, more than two thirds of Haiti’s work force 
is engaged in agriculture, and around three quarters of the total population depends on 
this sector. 
Pakistan had also been facing political disturbances throughout its history. 
Democracy had been struggling in the country and political governments had been 
toppled four times, and the military had been ruling the country for more than thirty years 
out of its total existence of about sixty four years. This led to the situation where 
institutions had been struggling and corruption had infiltrated almost every 
institution/organization. It was under military rule during the 2005 earthquake and was 
under political rule during the 2010 floods. The military is out of the government; 
however, it is perceived that the military has a strong role in the government’s major 
decision and policies. The war in Afghanistan and the drone attacks by the U.S. in the 
border areas of Pakistan have been a source of instability in the country. Pakistan has also 
been facing border issues with a larger neighbor, India, and has fought a number of wars 
in the past and the border still remains active almost throughout the year. Pakistan 
depends heavily on the agriculture sector and around 20% of its exports come from 
cotton only, and it also exports different commodities like rice and fruits, etc. After the 
floods, this sector was badly damaged and suffered great losses. Pakistan has a good 
leather industry and exports a number of leather goods to different countries. Due to the 
floods, it lost a lot of livestock and this sector was also very badly affected. 
This variable explores the state of overall stability of both the countries at 
the time of disaster and how it affected the response by the international community to 
help each country in relief and rehabilitation efforts.  The state of the economy of both 
countries at the time of the disaster is also explored in the context of impact on the relief 
and rehabilitation efforts by the government and any impact on the response from the 
international community.   
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b. State of Military Forces or Trained Human Resources Available 
for Rescue and Relief Work 
This variable explores the risk reduction and mitigation of human 
resources available to each country at the time of the disaster. The armed forces’ strength 
and capabilities, because they are well organized and often well equipped, is to be 
considered an important element for the government in case of any disaster.  This is 
especially true for those disasters, which are sudden in nature and require immediate and 
large scale response, like earthquakes, and also, which are greater in scale and require a 
large number of properly trained, organized, well coordinated and well resourced assets 
to respond, like floods.  The state of the armed forces and what other forces were 
available in both countries at the time of disaster is examined. 
c. Geographic Location and Level of Engagement with the 
International Community  
Pakistan is located very close to the mouth of the Persian Gulf from where 
most of the oil is shipped to the world, and is also connected to resource rich Central 
Asian States linking them to the sea.  It shares borders with China and India, which are 
both emerging economic, as well as military, powers in the region. It also shares borders 
with Afghanistan, where U.S. and NATO forces are engaged in a war against the Taliban, 
and Pakistan is their key non NATO ally and provides the main supply route for logistics, 
and Iran, which is also very oil rich and under the focus of the world, especially due to its 
nuclear issues. This location signifies the importance of Pakistan in international politics 
but poses a number of challenges as well.  Haiti had the advantage of being close to the 
U.S., and the fact that most of the UN agencies have their headquarters in the U.S. had an 
impact on response shown during the earthquake in 2010. Most of the information 
communication technologists were from the U.S. and could quickly and easily reach 
Haiti.  This variable will determine how much affect the geographic location and 
engagement level with the international community by both the countries had on the 
international community’s response. 
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2. Media Attention 
When Haiti was hit by the earthquake, the media throughout the world made it a 
top story, telling and showing the scale of damages and casualties suffered in the country. 
This ultimately created sympathy and mobilized a lot of volunteer individuals and 
organizations to rush to Haiti for help in rescue and relief efforts, in addition to the help 
coming to the country from other governments. This media projection also motivated the 
general public throughout the world, especially U.S. citizens, to make huge donations in 
terms of cash and goods, which helped a great deal in the rescue and recovery efforts. In 
the case of Pakistan, coverage was initially very minimal with the international media; it 
did not project floods as a large scale disaster due to lack of forecasting the scale of 
destruction and damage, which was to follow. By the time the severity of the scale of the 
disaster was realized and media started to highlight it, most of the general public did not 
take serious note of it and did not pay much attention to the calls for donations and help. 
This resulted in slower and less generous response from the public in terms of cash and 
goods donations. Another contributory reason may be that part of media highlighted the 
issues of corruption in the government ranks and also created doubts that the donations 
given may go in the hands of extremist militants fighting against the U.S. and NATO 
forces in Afghanistan. These types of media reports affected the motivation of general 
public to come forward to help Pakistan in terms of donations or volunteering to go there 
to help in rescue and relief operations.  This variable explores the effects of the media 
campaign on the international community response in the two exemplar cases. 
3. Nature of the Disaster 
Earthquakes occur at a particular time and cause a lot of infrastructure damage 
and casualties in a very short time, which sparks alarm all over the world and makes for 
very big news for people all around the world. This nature of the sudden disaster and 
large number of casualties makes people respond quickly to help in rescue and relief 
operations with a lot of resources. This factor also motivates sympathetic people to 
donate to the victims and to volunteer to participate in relief and recovery efforts as the 
destruction and damage is much more visible. In the case of floods, normally it builds 
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over a longer period time and generally causes less loss of life and therefore does not 
raise a loud alarm among the people and does not make for a very big story. Therefore, 
people generally do not respond aggressively for relief and recovery calls for floods. Due 
to a lower casualty rate, people feel less sympathetic and therefore donate less.  This 
variable explores how it affected the response by the international community in the two 
exemplar cases. 
4. Temporal Factors 
Fortunately, the world did not suffer any disaster of the scale of Haiti earthquake 
or Pakistan floods in year 2009, or January 2010 before the Haiti earthquake. Therefore, 
the NGOs and other volunteer organizations had their funds available to aggressively 
participate in rescue and relief efforts in Haiti. There was no major fundraising campaign 
run for the victims of a major disaster in the U.S. prior to the Haiti earthquake; and the 
people started to receive their tax return money, and therefore those people having 
motivation for charity had extra money for donations and they did so generously. A lot of 
funding was generated through donations by the governments and public around the 
world, especially from U.S. citizens in very quick response time. A lot of volunteers and 
NGOs reached Haiti in no time and took over all the relief and rehabilitation work in 
coordination with U.S. Southern Command and other forces. Pakistan floods occurred 
around seven months after the earthquake in Haiti, and by that time most of volunteers 
and NGOs had already exhausted their resources in Haiti and therefore were required to 
generate and collect fresh funding for their operations in Pakistan. Therefore, the 
sequence of occurrence of these events had a great impact on the response of 
international organizations, especially volunteers and NGOs.  This variable explores how 





B. WEIGHTING ASSIGNED TO EACH VARIABLE  
The weighting assigned to each variable is shown in Table 10. 
Variable Weighting (1:Least Significant –  
10: Most Significant) 
Pre-existing conditions in the country: 
• Overall Political and Economic 
Condition 
• Armed Forces/Trained Human 
Resource Available for Rescue and 
Relief efforts 
• Geographical Location and Level of 












Media Attention 8 
Nature of the Disaster 10 
Temporal Factors 8 
Table 10.    Table of Weighting for Each Variable 
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V. STATE OF VARIABLES 
In Chapter IV, variables were defined and explained and assigned weighting 
scores based on the perceived impact and influence these have on triggering a response 
by the international community to a major natural disaster. In this chapter, the state of 
each variable for both countries is examined, how the international community 
responded, and how that particular variable affected the response.  Based on that, the 
value of the variable for each country was determined.  The value assigned indicates for 
each variable how it affected a response from the international community for each 
country.  Taking into account values determined for all the variables, conclusions were 
drawn regarding the nature of the response from the international community and 
conditions to improve it. 
A. STATE OF EACH VARIABLE 
Each variable below explores the state of each country regarding that particular 
variable and how it affected the response of the international community.  The final value 
for each variable takes into account the affect that variable had in mobilizing response 
from the international community. 
1. Pre-existing Conditions in the Country  
The following pre-existing conditions were examined to determine the state of the 
country before the disaster. 
a. Overall Political and Economic Conditions 
Pakistan has been struggling for stability since its birth in 1947. The 
internal potential problems had been mainly contributed to a number of military coups, 
corrupt and inefficient political leaders, natural disasters, internal conflicts, the 
deteriorating law and order situation, suicide bombings and large scale violence in 
different regions of Pakistan.  Pakistan's support to the United States after September 11th 
against the Taliban in Afghanistan brought it face to face with radical extremist elements 
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within the country and from the western borders. These extremists, joined by other 
criminals, have been conducting acts of terrorism throughout the country causing further 
instability within its borders.152 The two provinces, Baluchistan and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa, including the tribal areas, are in the grip of insurgency, militancy, violence 
and terrorism. Two other provinces, Sindh and Punjab, have also been victims of terror 
attacks and a breakdown of the rule of law. The most prominent external reasons are a 
continuous tension along the borders with India almost throughout the history, the 
instability of Afghanistan due to ongoing war against Taliban, and the freedom 
movement going on in Kashmir. 
The U.S. State Department’s Global Peace Index placed Pakistan as the 
world’s fifth most unstable country after Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan and Sudan.153 
Pakistan’s ranking, according to the Global Peace Index (GPI), is 145 on a list of 149 
countries. Transparency International and the International Crisis Group have also 
expressed their concern over the state and progress of state institutions in the country 
because in the last four decades Pakistan’s performance has degraded in terms of 
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(Score out of 5) 
Haiti 
(Score out of 5) 
Internal Peace 60% Lower score indicates better performance 
External Peace 40%   
Perceptions of criminality 
in society 
4 3 4 
Number of internal 
security officers and 
police per 100,000 people 
3 2 2 
Level of organized 
Conflicts (internal) 
5 4 3 
Level of violent crime 4 3.5 4 
Political instability 4 4 3.75 
Level of disrespect for 
human rights (Political 
Terror Scale) 
4 4 2.5 
Potential for terrorist acts 5 4.5 2 
Number of deaths from 
organized Conflicts 
(internal) 
5 5 1 
Number of armed services 
personnel per 100,000 
people 
2 1 1 
Military 
capability/sophistication 
2 4 1 
Relations with 
neighboring countries 
5 4 2 
Funding for UN 
Peacekeeping Missions 
5 1 1.5 
Number of external and 
internal Conflicts fought: 
2003–08 
5 5 1.5 
Estimated number of 
deaths from organized 
Conflicts (external) 
5 2 1 
Table 11.   Comparison of Important GPI Indicators for Pakistan and Haiti155 
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Figure 33.   Comparison of GPI Indicators for Pakistan and Haiti 
The continuing security crisis led one U.S. index, published in Foreign 
Policy magazine in June 2010, to rank Pakistan as the tenth most failed state in the world, 
one place above Haiti in a list headed by Somalia.  A detailed comparison of both 
countries is shown in Table 12.156  
Indicator Pakistan (Score out of 10) Haiti (Score out of 10) 
Demographics Pressures 8.1 9.3 
Refugees/IDPs 8.9 5.6 
Group Grievance 9.4 7.3 
Human Plight 7.9 8.6 
Uneven Development 8.4 8.3 
Economic Decline 6.2 9.2 
Delegitimization of the State 8.9 9.3 
Public Services 7.3 9.5 
Human Rights 8.9 8.3 
Security Apparatus 9.7 8.2 
Factionalized Elites 9.5 8.4 
External Intervention 9.3 9.6 
Table 12.   Comparison of Failed States Index 2010157 
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Figure 34.   Comparison of Failed States Index 2010 
On the economic front, Pakistan was ranked 123rd in the Global 
Competitive Index (GCI) out of total of 139 countries surveyed in 2010.158 Its ranking 
was: 46th with respect to GDP ($166.5 billion), sixth in population (180.8 million), 113th 
with respect to GDP per capita (US$1,017), 23rd with respect to share in world GDP 
(0.63%), and 27th with respect to GDP (PPP) (US$435.8 billion).159 
In FY 2009 – 2010, the estimated GDP growth rate was 2.7%, and 
unemployment was estimated at 15%. Consumer price inflation averaged 13.4% in 
2010.160 Low levels of spending in the social services and high population growth have 
contributed to persistent poverty and unequal income distribution. The country’s 
economy remains vulnerable to internal and external shocks due to internal security 
concerns and the global financial crises. Pakistan has received significant loan/grant 
assistance from international financial institutions (e.g., the IMF, the World Bank, and 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB)) and bilateral donors, particularly after it began 
using its military/financial resources in counterterrorism efforts after the September 11, 
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2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Pakistan remains dependent on IMF and other 
international assistance for budgetary support, and to keep the country more or less 
solvent.  Pakistan's principal natural resources are arable land, water, hydroelectric 
potential, and natural gas reserves. About 28% of Pakistan's total land area is under 
cultivation and is watered by one of the largest irrigation systems in the world. 
Agriculture accounts for about 21% of GDP and employs about 42% of the labor force. 
The most important crops are cotton, wheat, rice, sugarcane, fruits, and vegetables, which 
together account for more than 75% of the value of total crop output. Pakistan's 
manufacturing sector accounts for about 25% of GDP. Cotton textile production and 
apparel manufacturing are Pakistan's largest industries, accounting for about 51.4% of 
total exports. Other major industries include food processing, beverages, construction 
materials, clothing, and paper products.  In the 2009 – 2010 fiscal years Pakistan’s trade 
deficit was $10.92 billion.  Energy imports account for nearly 30% of Pakistan's imports, 
and the total gap between electricity supply and demand in Pakistan is over 4,800 
megawatts (MW). The energy crisis and security concerns have hampered Pakistan’s 
textile reliant export base. Pakistan's exports continue to be dominated by cotton textiles 
and apparel, despite government diversification efforts.161 
The floods not only necessitated a huge rescue and relief operation but 
also threatened to undermine Pakistan’s halting recovery from the 2009 recession.  In 
addition to the damage to an already weak infrastructure and the worsening of the energy 
supply situation, standing crops of rice and cotton were destroyed in Punjab and Sindh. 
This would unfavorably impact the textile industry, which is crucial to Pakistan’s exports.  
Due to fighting between the Pakistan Army and extremist militants in the 
northwestern region, around one million people have been displaced and floods affected 
around 20 million people.  This made it impossible for the government to provide basic 
                                                 
161 U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Pakistan,” No Author, Bureau of South and Central 
Asian Affairs, 6 October 2010. Accessed 23 April 2011. Available 
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shelter, basic food, medical care and rehabilitation very effectively and created a great 
deal of social unrest among the affected people in the affected areas.162 
However, history shows that Pakistan has, throughout its existence, 
displayed a resilience rooted in the energy of the population, despite the devastations of 
natural disasters, wars and misgovernment. Just as most of the individuals survived the 
flood through their own resourcefulness and toughness, the citizens and NGOs form part 
of an emerging civil society, which was dramatically announced to the world by the 
unprecedented lawyers’ movement, which undermined ex-president General Musharraf 
and forced President Zardari to back down for his stand on the issue of restoration of 
Supreme Court Judges. Its emergence has shown the possibility of intellectual and 
political realignment in Pakistan.163 
Haiti has also struggled throughout its history for stability within the 
country and has suffered due to invasions, dictatorships and racial discrimination. It was 
ranked 114th out of 149 states in the Global Peace Index for 2010.164 It was ranked 11th 
among the failed states for 2010.165 The details are mentioned in Tables 11 and 12. 
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was 
established on June 1, 2004 by Security Council resolution 1542. The UN mission 
succeeded a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) authorized by the Security Council in 
February 2004 after President Bertrand Aristide departed Haiti for exile in the aftermath 
of an armed conflict, which spread to several cities across the country. MINUSTAH’s 
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original mandate was to restore a secure and stable environment, to promote the political 
process, to strengthen Haiti’s government institutions and rule of law structures, as well 
as to promote and to protect human rights.166 
In Haiti, a social contract between the state and its citizens is missing; 
Haitians do not feel entitled to demand respect for their rights or the provision of basic 
services because of the long history of weak political institutions and inefficient service 
delivery. Due to this lack of a social contract the ability of private interest groups such as 
the economic and political elite has increased to influence the political process, exploiting 
public emotions by breeding further resentment and further compromising the ability of 
the Haitian state to carry out basic functions effectively and efficiently. This has resulted 
in a vicious cycle of political conflict, social unrest and the threat of widespread 
violence.167 
Haiti is a free market economy that enjoys the advantages of low labor 
costs and tariff free access to the U.S. for many of its exports. Poverty, corruption, and 
poor access to education for much of the population are among Haiti's most serious 
disadvantages. It is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere with 80% of the 
population living under the poverty line and 54% in abject poverty; the damage to Port au 
Prince caused the country's GDP to contract an estimated 5.1% in 2010. Two thirds of all 
Haitians depend on the agricultural sector, mainly small scale subsistence farming, and 
remain vulnerable to damage from frequent natural disasters, exacerbated by the 
country's widespread deforestation. U.S. economic engagement under the Haitian 
Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act, passed in 
December 2006, has boosted apparel exports and investment by providing duty free 
access to the U.S. markets, Congress voted in 2010 to extend the legislation until 2020 
under the Haitian Economic Lift Act (HELP); the apparel sector accounts for three 
quarters of Haitian exports and nearly one tenth of GDP. Remittances are the primary 
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source of foreign exchange, equaling nearly 20% of GDP and more than twice the 
earnings from exports. Haiti suffers from a lack of investment, partly because of limited 
infrastructure and a lack of security. In 2005, Haiti paid its arrears to the World Bank, 
paving the way for reengagement with the Bank. Haiti received debt forgiveness for over 
$1 billion through the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative in mid 2009. The 
government relies on formal international economic assistance for fiscal sustainability, 
with over half of its annual budget coming from outside sources.168 
Haiti’s vulnerability to frequent natural hazards weakens the government’s 
ability to pursue and maintain momentum toward long term development goals. Haiti’s 
natural environment has been severely degraded, with little remaining forest cover, soil 
erosion and destabilized river catchments. These conditions subject the population to 
heightened risks from natural hazards. Haiti's economy suffered a severe setback when it 
was hit by the earthquake, which destroyed much of its capital city, Port au Prince, and 
neighboring areas.  Haiti’s economic loss due to the earthquake was about US$10 billion 
(84% of GDP) and insured damage was US$30 million (0.3% of economic loss).169 The 
loss of civil servants in the earthquake has weakened the government and added to the 
challenges already faced by national policy makers.170 
Political stability and the internal law and order situation in the disaster hit 
country is very important for the freedom of operation for local relief workers as well as 
attracting relief workers from abroad. It is a major concern for volunteer ICTs because 
they are usually operating on their own without proper government support and security.  
Political stability is particularly important to generate trust of the internal and external 
donors and also to attract volunteer organizations to send their experts and other work 
force into the country.  After a major disaster hits, the internal law and order situation is 
prone to become even worse due to government agencies themselves being stressed, 
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government focus on relief activities, the loss of shelter and defense, increased crimes 
such as theft, shoplifting, robbery and similar reasons.  As per the GPI and other analysis 
of both the countries, it is indicated that Pakistan was suffering from a poor political 
situation and law and order situation in the country at the time of disaster.  Many 
volunteers who were willing to go there to help people could not go due to deteriorated 
law and order conditions.  Many donors around the world did not have trust in the 
government to spend of funds for relief and recovery operations in some ways.  Haiti 
could be considered a comparatively stable country in terms of law and order conditions 
and its government, although not ideal, still did not have as much trust deficit as the 
Pakistani government had. This factor favored Haiti to influence international community 
to donate and to come physically in the country to participate in the relief and recovery 
operations.  Participation of a large number of U.S. military elements in the Haiti 
earthquake relief efforts motivated the whole of the international community to 
participate aggressively.   
The capacity of a country to withstand losses and carry out relief and 
rehabilitation of affected people due to a major disaster like an earthquake or floods 
greatly depends on its economical depth. This factor can also enable the victim country to 
attract loan giving organizations like World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) for provision of loan to help in coming out of a difficult economic situation. Those 
organizations are most willing to help countries, which have progressive economies 
because they can meet their schedule of returning loans as compared to poor states, which 
generally are unable to guarantee that they can meet their economic targets to clear debt.  
Pakistan has a much bigger economy than Haiti and is therefore more capable to absorb 
an economic blow than Haiti and this fact seemed to have favored Haiti in terms of 
support from governments and public as well.  Volunteer organizations also realized that 
Haiti would not be able to undertake relief and recovery operations and therefore 
mobilized most of their resources to help Haiti.  
The overall impact of internal stability led to the assigning of Haiti a score 
of ‘14’ and Pakistan a score of ‘6.’  
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b. State of Military Forces or Trained Human Resources Available 
for Rescue and Relief Works 
The availability of a trained and equipped professional force to provide 
response in case of a disaster is a great asset for the country.  The effectiveness of the 
international community, and especially ICT volunteers in the country, greatly depends 
on the quality of support and coordination provided by the government organizations. 
Donor support and provision of trained man power during relief and rehabilitation 
operations is also dependent on how many trained relief workers are available within the 
country and the state of their preparedness and equipment. 
Pakistan has a strong civil service and a strong military, which ranks 8th in 
the world with extensive experience and a tradition of responding to national disasters.  
In the case of the 2005 earthquake, the Pakistani army played the leading role in 
immediate disaster response, and local governments/institutions generally performed 
well.  The Pakistani government immediately set up the Federal Relief Commission to 
oversee and coordinate all aspects of emergency response (with military and civilian 
wings). The many international agencies that responded to the Pakistani earthquake 
worked under the direction of the Pakistani Federal Relief Commission, and often under 
the military.  After the 2005 earthquake Pakistan raised National Disaster Management 
Authority (NDMA), which works under National Disaster Management Commission 
(NDMC) headed by the Prime Minister and is tasked to prepare for disaster management 
and coordinate all relief and recovery operations in case a disaster hits the country.  The 
NDMA played a main role in the conduct and coordination of relief and recovery 
operations during the 2010 floods.  This was the main organization that coordinated and 
conducted most of the relief and recovery operations by the government.  It also 
coordinated all relief and recovery effort by the UN organizations, foreign country forces, 
INGOs, NGOs and other volunteers and help direct the relief goods and man power to 
much needed areas.  This organization has worked very effectively in relief and 
rehabilitation operations during the 2010 floods in Pakistan.   
Haiti had no regular military forces and only a small Coast Guard.  The 
police force was augmented by personnel of MINUSTAH and the forces from other 
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regional countries, which were a great help during the relief operations after the 
earthquake.  The regular Haitian Armed Forces (FAdH) had been demobilized and only 
existed on paper.171  
Pakistan could provide better coordination and support to the international 
community through NDMA, its military and other local forces.  On the other hand, Haiti 
had the advantage of having MINUSTAH and other regional forces present in the 
country, which were already settled and knew the situation on the ground.  Their strength 
was increased and they were able to effectively help in the relief and recovery efforts.  
However, different INGOs and UN organizations were in charge of all operations and no 
governmental organization could control or coordinate the relief or recovery operations.  
So, the overall control, support and coordination provided by Pakistani forces was better 
and helped the international community to reach where they were more needed and 
disburse aid to places in dire need. For this reason, Pakistan was assigned a score of ‘12’ 
and Haiti a score of ‘4.’   
c. Geographic Location 
The geographic location of the disaster hit country plays a very important 
role in mobilizing the international community, and both the government as well as the 
public. People, of course, generally care more for their neighboring countries than those 
far away from them. Also, the terrain of the victim country and climate have an effect on 
the conducting of relief and recovery operation, especially on the provision of relief work 
force by the foreign governments, NGOs and ICT volunteers. The relations and level of 
engagement of a country with the international community is an important factor in 
mobilizing the international community for financial and physical support for relief and 
recovery operations in case of a disaster hitting the country. For the most part, the 
international community responds without much consideration for past relations.  For 
example, Cuba, in spite of not having very good relations with Pakistan, was one of the  
 
                                                 
171 CIA, “The World Fact book- Haiti,” No Author. Accessed 28 April 2011. Available 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html. 
 107
major assistance providers during the 2005 earthquake.  Still, location is quite significant 
in determining the level and continuity of response from a number of donor countries for 
the disaster hit country.  
 
Figure 35.   Political Map of Pakistan172 
Pakistan is located in South Asia with an area of around 803,943 sq. km 
(310,527 sq. mi), almost twice the size of California. Islamabad is the capital city and 
other major cities include Karachi (the biggest and most populated city), Lahore (second 
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largest city), Faisalabad, Hyderabad, Quetta, Peshawar and Rawalpindi. Politically the 
country is subdivided into five provinces: Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as the North West Frontier Province or NWFP) and 
Giligit Baltistan (GB); the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which is 
composed of seven tribal agencies (Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, North 
Waziristan, and South Waziristan) and the Azad Jammu and Kashmir.173 
It is bordered by Iran, Afghanistan, China, India, and the Arabian Sea. It 
has had difficult and volatile relations with India mainly due to dispute over Kashmir, 
long standing close relations with China, and extensive security and economic interests in 
the Persian Gulf. It expresses a strong desire for a stable Afghanistan. Following the 1979 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Pakistani government played a vital role in 
supporting the Afghan resistance movement and assisting Afghan refugees. After the 
Soviet withdrawal in February 1989, Pakistan, with cooperation from the world 
community, continued to provide extensive support for displaced Afghans. Continued 
turmoil in Afghanistan prevented the refugees from returning to their country. In 1999, 
more than 1.2 million registered Afghan refugees remained in Pakistan. Pakistan was one 
of three countries to recognize the Taliban regime of Afghanistan. International pressure 
after September 11, 2001, prompted Pakistan to reassess its relations with the Taliban 
regime and support the U.S. and international coalition in Operation Enduring Freedom 
to remove the Taliban from power. In 1950, Pakistan was among the first countries to 
recognize the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). Following the Sino Indian hostilities 
of 1962, Pakistan's relations with China became stronger; since then, the countries have 
regularly exchanged high level visits resulting in various agreements. China has provided 
economic, military, and technical assistance to Pakistan.  
The United States and Pakistan established diplomatic relations in 1947. 
These relations have seen a number of ups and downs over the years.  Due to its 
geographic location, Pakistan had been an important ally of the U.S. in the Cold War 
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Asian Affairs, 6 October 2010. Accessed 23 April 2011. Available 
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against former U.S.S.R. and joined CENTO and SEATO treaties.  After the September 
11th attacks in the U.S. Pakistan again became an important ally for the U.S. in the 
Global War Against Terrorism (GWAT); and in 2004 the United States recognized closer 
bilateral ties with Pakistan by designating Pakistan as a Major Non NATO Ally. 
 
Figure 36.   Map of Haiti174 
Haiti is located between the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean, 
west of the Dominican Republic, and shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican 
Republic (western one third is Haiti and eastern two thirds is Dominican Republic).  Its 
total area is around 27,750 sq. km, slightly smaller than Maryland.   
                                                 
174 CIA, “The World Fact book – Haiti,” No Author. Accessed 6 May 2011. Available 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_ha.html. 
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The Dominican Republic and Haiti share the island of Hispaniola, but 
traditionally relations between the two countries have seldom been good. In the 
nineteenth century, Haiti repeatedly invaded, plundered, and occupied the Dominican 
Republic.  The Dominicans tended to see Haiti as black, African, and uncivilized.  Most 
of the Haitian political exiles often settled in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 
which they used as a springboard for their partisan activities. A number of Dominican 
governments had also tried to influence political events in Haiti. 
The U.S. declared independence from Britain in 1776, the first to do so in 
the Western Hemisphere, followed by Haiti, which broke away from France in 1804.  But 
that is where the similarities end. While the American War of Independence was driven 
by white elite unwilling to continue paying taxes to its colonial masters as one of the 
many reasons, the Haitian revolution was led by a freed slave, Toussaint Louverture.   
The existence of a nation of freed slaves to the south became an 
inspiration for slaves in the U.S., and a thorn in the side of many southerners who relied 
on slavery for their economy.  The animosity of some of the southern states towards Haiti 
soured relations between the two nations for decades and played a big part in delaying its 
official recognition by the U.S. until 1862, fifty eight years after its independence.  But 
Haiti's geographic proximity to the U.S. and its strategic location in the Caribbean 
sparked the interest of American administrations. 
Haiti has the a great advantage of being close to the United States and 
having great diaspora there, which was instrumental in mobilizing the government and 
the general public to help Haiti in their time of need.  The response from all regional 
countries was very encouraging and the neighboring country, Dominican Republic, also 
helped a lot during relief operations in spite of having their differences.  The United 
States was the major contributor in terms of manpower, monetary help from government 
and donations from the public.  Pakistan did get help from all its neighboring countries, 
especially China and Iran.  The United States was also the main contributor of relief and 
recovery help efforts in Pakistan, but the scale was much less than with Haiti, especially 
in terms of public donations, which were very meager in the case of Pakistan.   
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Pakistan’s location makes it a very important country in world politics and 
it played an important role in the past and currently is again in the Global War Against 
Terrorism (GWAT).  Its location and engagement with the world made most of the 
countries come forward and help during flood relief and recovery operations. So we 
consider that Pakistan had an edge over Haiti as far as geographic location and 
engagement with the world is concerned for attracting the international community for 
help. Therefore we assign Pakistan a score ‘10.5’ and Haiti a score ‘3.5.’  
2. Media Attention 
The media coverage of the floods in Pakistan, especially by western media, was 
very slow and less extensive compared to the Haiti earthquake. In the case of Pakistan 
floods, there were only 320 broadcast news stories and 730 print news stories within the 
first ten days of the crisis, and in case of the Haiti earthquake there were well over 3,000 
stories by print and broadcast within ten days of the crisis.175 
Some main themes of media coverage in the case of Pakistan floods by local and 
international media were:176 
• Media coverage was more focused on political rather than the human 
dimension of tragedy. 
• Important sub texts were: 
• Government inaction and incompetence 
• Room created for militant groups to provide assistance and peddle 
ideology 
• Government insensitivity to plight of people 
• Pakistani floods could further hurt unstable nation as military 
focuses on aid 
• With flooding, Pakistan focus on fighting terror at risk 
• Pakistan President recognizes floods potential to destabilize nation 
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Chancery, Embassy of Pakistan, Washington DC during interview on 25 February 2011. 
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• Slow Pakistan response to flood hurts Zardari 
• Pakistan floods: minister says aid won’t go to extremists 
• Pakistan militants seeking to exploit flood chaos 
• Pakistan floods provide political boon to Islamic militants 
• World increases flood aid to Pakistan, U.S. worried extremists may 
benefit from crisis 
• Flood brings chaos back to Pakistan’s Swat valley 
• Is Pakistan heading for a coup? 
• Pakistan government on rocky ground amid flooding, terrorism, 
plummeting economy 
• Pakistan floods threaten to wash out U.S. war plans 
• Pakistan in political crisis amid allegations of flooding aid 
corruption 
• Pakistan’s instability puts army, U.S. on edge 
Unfortunately, the international media, especially western and U.S. media, 
showed disbelief about Pakistan.  They assumed the worst to come out of Pakistan due to 
the floods, like militancy and misuse of donated money.  We have seen that the suffering 
of the Pakistani people had to have a negative political context to be news.  It seemed that 
mere Pakistani pain sometimes does not seem enough. Also, the role of social media did 
not seem very effective and strong during the crises. 
Haiti got great media attention right from the beginning of the earthquake. There 
were well over 3,000 print and broadcast reports within ten days of the crisis. The media 
reported the poor state of the people.  Some of the media outlets like CNN and New York 
Times even served in relief capacities by partnering with NGOs and Google to create a 
unified Haitian people finder.  Haiti was used as a test laboratory for many of the modern 
social media tools like Twitter and Facebook, and these proved very effective in finding 
relatives and also mobilizing people for help through donations, etc. 
Media is a very important tool in the present world to influence the masses and 
build up their perception of an issue.  This tool was unfortunately mishandled and 
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political issues were highlighted during the disaster, which were not very relevant to the 
relief and recovery operations.  However, the perception about the government and the 
country of Pakistan that was created among the general public within the country and 
abroad, adversely affected the donations given by the public, especially in the United 
States and Western world.  So, the effects generated by the media demoralized the 
international community for helping Pakistan more than it would have with reporting of 
the event based on purely humanitarian grounds.  Therefore, Pakistan was assigned a 
score of ‘4’ and Haiti a score of ‘12’ based on the analysis of the response shown by the 
media in both the events.  
3. Nature of the Disaster 
Earthquakes have killed more people in the last ten years than any other form of 
natural disaster. Almost 60 percent of the people killed by natural disasters between 2000 
and 2009 perished in earthquakes, and comparatively very less died in floods. On the 
other hand, about 44% of the two billion people impacted by disasters were affected by 
floods and only 4% were affected by the earthquakes. The earthquakes claimed more 
lives because earthquakes were sudden and had an immediate impact, while floods could 
be predicted and their impacts were slow. The area affected by earthquakes is also 
comparatively small.177 Both the disasters are accompanied with different types of after 
effects. Earthquakes normally damage the urban infrastructure, industry, real estate, result 
in loss of life, and results in the loss of a great number of trained and experienced human 
resources while also adversely affecting insurance industry, etc. On the other hand, floods 
mostly affect rural areas and its major victims are agriculture, rail/road infrastructure, 
industry, livestock, fishery, poultry, and inundation of a large area for longer time results 
in a large number of displaced people who require continuous support.  There is also a 
great threat of outbreak of waterborne epidemics. 
The larger number of casualties generates a greater sympathetic feeling among the 
public than a slower onset of a crisis with more adverse effects and more people affected. 
The international community responded more aggressively to the earthquake affected 
                                                 
177 IRIN Global, “DISASTERS: Earthquakes – the decade’s deadliest killer.”  
 114
population mainly because of more deaths, as compared to a flood like disaster where, 
although deaths are less, the population affected is much greater in number.  Therefore, 
this factor favored Haiti to attract the international community for the support and help in 
relief and recovery operations.  We therefore assigned Haiti a score of ‘12’ and Pakistan a 
score of ‘4.’  
4. Temporal Factors 
The timing associated with a disaster is a crucial issue because of a number of 
considerations, such as the state of the budget of countries, NGOs and other relief 
organizations at that time, weather to be encountered during relief and rehabilitation 
operations, etc. The sequence of events of that particular disaster as compared to other 
major disasters occurring in other parts of the world is also very important as this dictates 
the resources left within the international community, including countries, NGOs and 
ICT volunteers and their level of participation in the relief and rehabilitation operations. 
No major disaster occurred in 2009 in any part of the world, so when Haiti was hit 
by the earthquake in January 2010, most of the countries, UN organizations, INGOs, ICT 
volunteers and general public, especially in the United States and Western countries, had 
maximum resources available to participate in the relief and recovery efforts.  The 
international community participated in all forms in the Haiti relief and recovery efforts 
very generously, which exhausted many of their resources.  When Pakistan suffered 
heavy floods in the months of July – September 2010, the international community had 
already exhausted most of their resources in Haiti and was therefore left with limited 
stocks and energy to participate in the relief and recovery operations.  Fresh funding from 
countries and the public, which was not readily available, therefore delayed the response 
by the international community.  The month of January being the start of the year when 
Haiti was hit by the earthquake allowed the general public to donate generously, 
especially the Americans who had more money to donate because they had started to 
receive tax returns and therefore had some extra money to donate, which was not possible 
in the months when Pakistan floods occurred. 
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We consider that the timeframe of the occurrence of the earthquake in Haiti 
afforded the international community more flexibility to exert their resources and energy 
in the form of manpower participation as compared to Pakistan.  Therefore we assigned 
Haiti a score of ‘12’ and Pakistan a score of ‘4’ based on the effects of the relative 
timings the disasters had on the response shown by the international community.  
B. OVERALL RESPONSE BASED ON COMPARING ALL VARIABLES 
The overall response based on our discussion of all the variables is presented in 
Table 13 and shown in Figure 37. 
 






Stability of the 
government 
10 6 14 
State of the 
military forces or 
trained human 
resource available 
for rescue and 
relief works 
8 12 4 
Geographical 
location 
7 10.5 3.5 
Media Attention 8 4 12 
Nature of the 
Disaster 
8 4 12 
Temporal Factor 8 4 12 
Table 13.   Values Assigned to each Variable for Both Countries 
 116
 
Figure 37.   Comparison of Values Given to Both Countries for each Variable 
Statistical Analysis 
  Pakistan Haiti 
   
Mean 6.75 9.583333 
Standard Error 1.470544117 1.872684 
Median 5 12 
Mode 4 12 
Standard Deviation 3.602082731 4.58712 
Sample Variance 12.975 21.04167 
Kurtosis -1.55423391 -1.78495 
Skewness 0.864143607 -0.84131 
Range 8 10.5 
Minimum 4 3.5 
Maximum 12 14 
Sum 40.5 57.5 
Count 6 6 
Figure 38.   Statistical Analysis of Variables 
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Figure 39.   Plot of Statistical Analysis of Variables 
Statistical analysis of the values assigned to all variables for both countries as 
shown in Figure 38 indicated that the response shown by the international community 
was not equitable in the compared cases.  The analysis determined that the response by 
the international community to the Haiti earthquake was better than it was to the Pakistan 
floods. 
The next chapter will conclude the discussion by exploring what the specific 
reasons were for this difference in response by the international community and will also 
present some recommendations to improve and make it equitable. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Humanitarian assistance provided by the international community in a major 
disaster may be considered a lifeline for any country, whether it is a developed one like 
Japan or Australia or a developing/poor country like Pakistan or Haiti.  It is particularly 
significant for poor or developing countries whose own infrastructures are not capable of 
dealing with immediate effects and subsequent relief and recovery operations in case of a 
major disaster.  The Pakistan floods in later half of 2010 and Haiti earthquake in January 
2010 were exemplar cases to study the differences in the response by the international 
community and propose measures both to improve the response and address the inequity.  
The main objective of this research was to propose measures to make the HA/DR 
response by the international community equitable in case of any disaster occurring in 
any country regardless of conditions discussed in earlier chapters. 
A. WHY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY RESPONSE WAS 
DIFFERENT IN PAKISTAN AND HAITI 
The international community showed comparatively more aggressive, timely and 
comprehensive response in case of the Haiti earthquake than the Pakistan floods, both by 
governments and the public.  Within ten days of the onset of the crisis, the international 
community pledged $495 per person to the victims of the Haiti earthquake, and in 
contrast only $3.20 were committed per flood affected person in Pakistan.178 The 
potential reasons for this difference in the response by the international community were: 
• The flooding in Pakistan received minimal and non dramatic print and TV 
news coverage relative to Haiti and other humanitarian disasters.  The 
media did not cover the Pakistani floods as a top story or cause for alarm.  
There were well over 3,000 stories by print and broadcast media by day 
ten during the Haiti earthquake crisis, while in case of the Pakistan floods 
                                                 
178 C. Christine Fair, “Averting Our Eyes: The Shameful International Response to Pakistanis’ 
Sufferings,” 16 November 2010. Accessed 27 March 2011. Available http://www.huffingtonpost.com/c-
christine-fair/averting-our-eyes-the-sha_b_784325.html. 
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there were only 320 broadcast news stories and 720 print news stories.179 
Media coverage of the deaths and horrific injuries in Haiti was widespread 
along with other images of destruction.  In the case of the Pakistan floods, 
the media coverage was focused more on political rather than the human 
dimension of the tragedy.  The local media kept highlighting the internal 
political issues, corruption among government high ranks and security 
issues; it failed to create realization among the local populace and people 
abroad regarding the scale of disaster that was occurring. 
• International media continued targeting Pakistan for its alleged ties with 
militant groups like Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Afghan 
Taliban.  It also created a sense of distrust among the general public in the 
U.S. and the West about the judicious use of aid and created fear that the 
aid provided to the country may fall in the hands of militant groups. 
• One of the popular storylines was that the Islamist militant groups will 
help if the world does not.  The fact was that the contributions by the 
Islamic militant groups to the crisis were more hype than reality, as there 
were only twenty nine camps being run by Islamic groups compared to 
more than 5,000 camps run by the government.180 There was thus a 
competing narrative that polluted or corrupted the humanitarian issue 
particularly in the U.S. and western countries, who are major donors in 
case of a disaster, and this resulted in a much slower and shallow response 
from the public as well as the humanitarian relief organizations to make 
donations in terms of cash and relief goods for flood affected people in 
Pakistan.   
• The Pakistani leadership failed to make the scope of destruction and the 
urgency of the need clear to the donors from the international community.  
The political leadership in Pakistan particularly failed to show the world 
the seriousness of the flood crises.  President Zardari’s visit to Europe at a 
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time when the country started to feel the effects of the floods was highly 
criticized throughout the world and was considered an example of his 
government’s non seriousness to the issue.  On the other hand, when Haiti 
was hit by the earthquake. its president declared the situation in his 
country as “unimaginable” and requested help from the international 
community, which was heard with sympathetic ears across the world. 
• Pakistan was facing severe security crises at the time the floods occurred 
in the country.  Pakistan, particularly the flooded areas, had a global 
reputation for being dangerous.  A number of volunteers who otherwise 
wanted to visit the country to participate in relief and recovery efforts did 
not go there due to security issues.  In Haiti there was not such security 
issues for individuals and therefore quite a large number of volunteers and 
volunteer organizations participated in the HA/DR operations after the 
earthquake. 
• One of the feelings among the international community was that it has had 
to repeatedly bail Pakistan out of various compounding crises. Pakistani 
political elites, who are mainly wealthy landlords or industrialists, have 
always resisted any tax reforms, which would generate revenue for the 
country through implementing taxes on agriculture land or business and 
always preferred to raise revenue through regressive sales taxes that 
mostly punish the poor.  Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated "It's 
absolutely unacceptable for those with means in Pakistan not to be doing 
their fair share to help their own people while taxpayers in Europe, the 
United States and other contributing countries are all chipping in."181 
• The international community was reluctant to help the flood victims in 
Pakistan due to the fact that Pakistan's territory had been used by militants 
groups responsible for launching attacks against the U.S. and NATO 
forces in Afghanistan. Also, the numbers of Pakistani Americans or  
Pakistani Europeans involved in terrorist activities in the United States and 
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the Europe have left the international community apprehensive about 
Pakistan.  
• Unlike Haiti, Pakistan has one of the world's largest militaries. The 
availability of military strength was considered an asset and the 
international community likely believed that the country was quite capable 
of handling the crises and so they contributed less in terms of work force.  
But there was also a concern among the international community about the 
suspected use of donated money by the military for furthering its strength.  
These factors, coupled with other stories, had an adverse effect on the 
international community to help Pakistani flood victims.  
• Another reason the international community was hesitant to give to flood 
relief efforts was because of alleged widespread corruption across the 
government and fears that moneys sent would be diverted into the pockets 
of Pakistan's corrupt minions rather than the displaced, homeless, food 
deprived millions. There is a great trust deficit existing between 
government, its own populace and the international community, which 
was evident by the meager donations in the President’s Flood Relief Fund.  
Most of the local people preferred to donate through NGOs and the 
international community also preferred to channel aid through NGOs and 
UN agencies rather than the Pakistan government.182 
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• Haiti received timely and aggressive response from the government and 
public of the U.S. due to its location being closer to the U.S. and also its 
important geographic location in the Caribbean.  Due to being in close 
proximity to the U.S., many civic groups could simply collect relief items 
and travel to Haiti on their own.  Moreover, the presence of a large 
number of Haitians and Haitian Americans living in the U.S. (around 1.7 
million as of 2010)183 generated considerable interest in responding while 
the corresponding number of Pakistanis living in the U.S. (approximately 
349,685 as of 2008)184 was much lower and they could not play a similar 
role.   
• One of the reasons for the slow pace of donations by the international 
community for flood victims in Pakistan was likely due to the nature of 
the disaster.  Floods are slow building disasters, which have less loss of 
life and are therefore harder to gain sympathy of people away from the 
scene and to raise money for the victims.  The rising flood waters don’t 
trigger the same sense of urgency and alarm as an earthquake that 
demolishes buildings and kills hundreds of thousands of people in a few 
seconds.  The relatively low number of deaths due to floods in Pakistan 
compared with the Haiti earthquake was undoubtedly a factor, as was the 
nature of the injuries suffered.  The New York Times' Neil 
MacFarquhar described the floods as not being as sufficiently "dramatic, 
emotional and telegenic" as the earthquakes and tsunamis that so opened 
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American wallets.185 Floods have been described as slow motion disasters 
that cannot be effectively conveyed in a single photograph or piece of 
video.   
• By most accounts, Haiti, prior to the January 2010 earthquake, enjoyed 
relative internal stability.  The government was relatively stable and 
working with approval from the public and people had confidence that the 
government was going to stay for its legitimate duration.  The government 
of Pakistan, on the other hand, was faced with internal stability challenges; 
the government was surviving one after the other predicted fall.  The 
political coalition partners had differences with the government on major 
issues at various times and left the coalition, which led to predictions that 
it will fall soon but it somehow managed to get them back in the 
government or was able to get support from other political groups and 
could manage to avoid its fall.  But the public generally did not believe 
that the government would be able to complete its tenure due to its 
incapability to control corruption, inflation, unemployment and other 
issues. 
• Presence of MINUSTAH personnel prior to the earthquake in Haiti was 
helpful in triggering UN response more aggressively just after the 
earthquake hit the country.  Its strength was increased and mandate was 
extended to participate in relief and recovery operations. 
• Large scale involvement of U.S. Southern Command provided great trust 
among the INGOs and other volunteers to get involved in the relief and 
recovery efforts.  The U.S. Southern command was only focused in Haiti 
towards earthquake relief operations.  It used all its assets for earthquake 
relief operations and restoring/building infrastructure within the country, 
and therefore all its press releases and conferences were focused on the 
earthquake.  This focused and aggressive media projection of the 
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earthquake relief activities motivated the general public within the U.S. to 
give more donations for the victims and relief operations.  Whereas in case 
of Pakistan, U.S. Central Command was already engaged in two wars and 
its main focus was on those wars.  It did not spare many of its resources 
for flood relief operations and therefore its presence in the relief 
operations was not prominent, and therefore the public in the U.S. and the 
west did not see in the media many U.S. assets involved in the flood relief 
activities. Therefore it could not generate the same type of effect among 
the public to motivate them for more donations, which was generated by 
U.S. Southern Command’s involvement in Haiti.  It was an occasion, 
which could have been used to show U.S. support for the government and 
public of Pakistan by more and more flags showing in the relief operations 
in terms of helicopters, vessels, relief goods, men or whatever means 
possible.  The U.S. was undoubtedly the major relief provider in the floods 
relief operations, but considering its resources that could have been very 
easily mobilized from Afghanistan and role of Pakistan in war against 
terrorism, it could have done much more to win the hearts of many 
Pakistani people, and this could have helped the Pakistani government and 
U.S. agencies to further isolate the extremist elements in the country.   
• August is a vacation season in the U.S. and most of the West, when many 
people pay less attention to the news.  One of the reasons that general 
public from the U.S. and western countries did not follow the onset of 
Pakistan’s flood tragedy on the media, which was already late in reporting 
the exact scale of the disaster, was this vacation season when people were 
away from their homes and were not regularly watching or reading the 
news.  For example, during this season even new TV episodes in the U.S. 
are suspended as many people stop watching them due to vacations.    
• Pakistan lacked Haiti's network of Western charities.  As a result, it lacked 
Haiti's preexisting network of Christian humanitarian organizations and 
missionaries that have been in the country for decades. Those Christian 
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missionaries in Haiti, predominantly Americans doing a combination of 
religious and humanitarian work, were so important because they could 
use American churches as a vast grassroots network to communicate 
Haiti's plight to Americans and especially to raise money. But Pakistan 
has no such large scale, long term presence of these charities, which could 
raise a voice to the general public in the West and the U.S. to ask them to 
donate to its flood victims. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The experiences in both Haiti and Pakistan highlighted the importance of taking 
preemptive measures to save more lives and effectively mitigate the effects of natural 
disasters.  It is a fact that earthquakes, monsoons and other natural disasters cannot be 
prevented by human actions, but countries can take actions that may help to decrease the 
risk to their populations.  The importance of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) has long 
been recognized as an important hallmark of good development planning and 
reconstruction process, but unfortunately it has been generally harder to generate both 
political and donor support for long term mitigation measures than for immediate 
response to disaster victims.  It is evident that DRR measures save lives.  For example, 
during the 2001 Bhuj earthquake in India, most government buildings that conformed to 
construction codes suffered only limited damage, while schools and hospitals that did not 
follow the codes completely collapsed.  When Cyclone Sidr struck in November 2007, an 
estimated 3.2 million Bangladeshis were evacuated from the coastal areas and over two 
million were already in special shelters when the cyclone hit. About 4,000 Bangladeshis 
died, compared with around 140,000 in a similar cyclone in 1991 and up to 500,000 in 
1970.  Therefore, it is very important to have a disaster risk management as an integral 
part of the government administration in all countries.  An organizational construction to 
enable more effective HA/DR response is the primary recommendation. 
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1. Proposed Disaster Management Organization 
A proposed model organization as described in Figure 40 may be considered by 
all the countries to prepare for disaster risk management and to undertake relief and 
recovery operations in an effective and well coordinated manner.  This model 
organization may be considered as a macro level organizational guideline for countries, 
NGOs and UN organizations to prepare a comprehensive organization based on a 
respective country’s local conditions, needs, resources, and other such factors.  The goal 
here is to have an organization for every country that could provide better coordination of 
HA/DR operations amongst all the involved actors both from local and international 
community. 
 
Figure 40.   Proposed Organizational Model for Disaster Management Authority 
The proposed duties and responsibilities of each tier in the above model 
organization are described below. 
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a. Disaster Management Authority (DMA) 
We propose that United Nations Organization (UNO) should pass a 
resolution to bind all member states to have a Disaster Management Authority (DMA) as 
an integral part of its administration at the national level.  This authority may be 
responsible to the head of the country for overall preparation and conduct of HA/DR 
operations.  The DMA should exercise overall coordination and control responsibilities 
over all organizations, which are involved in the preparations for disaster risk reduction 
and also those, which are involved in relief and recovery operations after a disaster hits 
the country.  To perform its functions the DMA should be assisted by a Country 
Coordinator at UNO, UNOCHA, Inland Coordinator and a Relief Manager/Auditor.  
Through these controllers the DMA will be able to use all resources, those available from 
within the country and those provided by the international community, more effectively 
and in an organized and well coordinated manner.  Some of the DMA’s functions may 
include ensuring measures taken to avoid any disaster that can be avoided, should prepare 
work force to mitigate after effects of a disaster, should ensure acquiring of machinery, 
tools and materials needed for conduct of HA/DR operations, should enforce measures to 
reduce effects of disasters such as enforcing proper building codes, strengthening of 
river/canal banks, etc., and should also prepare master plans for relief and recovery 
operations in case of all possible disasters the country may be prone to face.    
b. Country Coordinator (CC) at UNO  
Each member state should have a country coordinator designated at UNO 
who is to assist the DMA in coordinating overall HA/DR operations with the 
international community.  This country coordinator should have all the records of his 
country’s vulnerabilities from certain well known disasters the country is prone to, should 
help the DMA in preparing national plans to carry out relief and recovery operations in 
consultation with experts from UNO and other related people from the international 
community and locals, should have worked in advance with DMA a list of requirements 
that his country would need from international community in case of a particular disaster 
hits his country, and should have detailed record of resources his country can provide to 
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the international community for HA/DR operations in any other country.  The country 
coordinator at UNO may be made responsible for making available its country’s 
resources and capabilities for helping in relief and recovery efforts in case of disasters 
hitting other countries and also presenting his country’s requirements at UNO in case his 
own country is hit by a disaster.  This coordinator may have worked out in advance what 
expected disasters his country may suffer are and what resources available with his 
country to conduct relief and recovery operations are, and should also have pre-hand 
information available for short term and immediate requirements that are to be provided 
by the international community.  He can then in the meantime work out midterm and long 
term requirements his country requires to be met by international community.   
c. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UNOCHA) 
UNOCHA may assist the DMA in coordinating relief and recovery efforts 
provided by all UN agencies, INGOs, ICT volunteers and other elements of the 
international community.  It should assist the DMA with help of other organizations such 
as World Bank (WB) and The Asian Development Bank (ADB), etc., in accurate damage 
assessment and launching appeals for relief and rehabilitation from the international 
community.  It should also work closely with country coordinator at UNO and relief 
manager/auditor to assist them in performing their functions and ensuring transparency in 
relief and cash disbursement and spending.  Due to its expertise and experience, 
UNOCHA may help the DMA much more in all areas of HA/DR operations and DRR 
efforts. 
d. Inland Coordinator (ICoord) 
An inland coordinator should be responsible for coordinating and 
managing inland resources and ensuring their optimal utilization and control.  He should 
exercise control over designated federal/military personnel, local meteorology 
department, provincial/local DRMs, communication/technical coordinator and local 
NGOs/trusts and other local elements involved in the HA/DR operations in any respect to 
help the DMA in achieving his objectives in preparing for and conduct of relief and 
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recovery operations in a disaster.  Federal and military personnel assigned for 
participating in the HA/DR operation may be functioning under the control of the DMA 
through a designated commander from the military, all provincial/local governments 
should have their disaster management organizations and plans ready and coordinated 
with the DMA, for better communication set up and provision of required technical 
assistance in HA/DR operations inland coordinator should have a comms/tech 
coordinator working under him.  He should also coordinate all the effort of local NGOs 
and charities for their effective application and even distribution to all affected areas.  A 
meteorology department should also be responsible to the inland coordinator for updates 
on weather and other information leading to any disaster.  The UNO may also work that 
all meteorology data specially that leads to the prediction about development of a major 
weather anomaly is shared within all member states, so predictions may be used to better 
prepare for and fight a disaster and to save maximum lives.   
e. Relief Manager/Auditor (RM/A) 
A relief manager/auditor may be appointed by the UNO to assist the DMA 
in accounting for all the relief provided from within the country and by the international 
community and may also be conduct audits throughout the relief and recovery process for 
ensuring transparency in collection and distribution of relief goods as well as cash 
donations. A relief manager may work under the DMA to account for all relief made 
available through all resources and to do continuous audits that it is being used in the 
right way.  He may be appointed by the UNO so that there should be a sense of 
satisfaction for all individuals and organizations that their donations and funds are being 
used properly.  
This organizational construct is mainly designed to address the issue of 
coordination among different elements involved in the HA/DR operations, transparency 
in use of funds provided from within and the country and from abroad for relief and 
rehabilitation operations, to have data available for asking or offering help in case of a 
disaster, and to achieve minimum readiness level in advance of suffering from a disaster.  
To achieve redundancy the different elements of this model organization, which are 
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stationed within the country, may be dispersed to different locations preferably away 
from each other, so that in case of one location being hit by a disaster, the other elements 
remain available to conduct relief operations.  It may be considered to have a standby for 
those nodes at different locations, so that whole organization remains intact with all its 
elements in case of a disaster happening at any location.   
2. General Recommendations 
The following are recommended measures considered to be important in 
improving the response of the international community in an HA/DR operation 
conducted at any part of the world: 
• The local community’s ability to respond to any type of disaster should be 
strengthened, because they are in the best position to save many more 
lives than any other organization that has to be mobilized after a disaster 
hits a particular place.  It also requires comparatively much less funding 
than deploying other local and international assets that are very expensive. 
• Every country must be responsible for preparation, updating and online 
availability of its street level mapping in a variety of formats for use by 
relief workers.  ICT volunteers and other concerned international 
organizations may provide all possible help to achieve this goal.  There 
may also be legislation at UNO to limit the use of such open street maps 
for humanitarian purposes only to address the concerns of certain 
countries that these maps may be used for military purposes against them.  
• The media needs to have a consensus on a code of conduct to be followed 
about a country, which is hit by a disaster.  It may be considered to 
highlight more of the humanitarian side of the crisis than any political 
issues.  Although there may be genuine political and administrative issues 
with the concerned country, these issues may not be reported in a manner 
that these have adverse effects on the humanitarian response from the 
international community.  For example, in many countries live reporting 
of terrorist or crime incidents is not done due to its value for the terrorists 
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and disadvantage for law enforcing agencies.  In the similar manner, it 
may be considered to focus more on the humanitarian crisis if a country is 
suffering from a disaster than other issues like corruption, bad governance, 
political disputes, etc.  Moreover, the media has many information experts 
who may tell people alternatives available for humanitarian assistance in 
case the country has a really bad government and cannot avoid reporting 
it.  The media can really play a great role in directing the people’s 
sympathies and donations for relief and rehabilitation efforts.  Media may  
educate the people that all humans feel pain when they are suffering from 
a disaster regardless of their location and political or other issues and they 
need help.   
• Governments have to ensure transparency in their system of relief 
distribution and funds disbursement for motivating people to donate 
directly to the government’s funds.  This will help in avoiding overhead 
cost when funding private organizations or NGOs, which is in most cases 
more than 45% of total donations collected. Also, too many private 
organizations get involved, which poses additional administrative and 
coordination problems.  Like in Pakistan flood case, due to confusion and 
organizational constraints, the UN used only two thirds of more than the 
$1 billion it raised for relief because too many agencies and charities had 
been brought in.186 In a case where the victim country had an organization 
similar to the proposed model organization, all elements could have taken 
control of their respective areas of responsibility and every 
organization/element would have known in advance its tasks.  All 
resources available and provided could have been used more effectively 
and judicially.  The UNO appointed relief manager/auditor could have 
been used to ensure transparency in the distribution of relief goods and 
funds.  It could have been instrumental in strengthening the confidence of 
                                                 
186 BBC News, “Britain criticizes UN Pakistan Flood Response,” No author, updated 10 May 2011. 
Accessed 16 May 2011. Available http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13343378. 
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public, charity organizations and governments in transparent use of their 
donations and could have motivated them for much more donations and 
help.   
• The nature of the disaster is a very important consideration to gain the 
sympathies of the international community.  In the case of an earthquake, 
there is normally much more loss of life than compared to floods where 
people affected are comparatively much more, but a greater number of 
casualties normally motivate people to donate much more.  The media 
may play an important role in educating people that those who are dead in 
an earthquake do not need much of the rehabilitation efforts, but those 
who are injured need help.  In fact the number of deaths and injuries in an 
earthquake are immediately visible and highlighted, which gets the 
attention of most of the people and they donate generously for them.  
Whereas floods are generally a slow moving disaster, which normally 
affects a greater number of people than an earthquake, these effects are not 
very visible.  Floods last for a longer duration, a lot of people are 
displaced who lose shelters, livestock, infrastructures and earnings/jobs.  
They not only need help to survive the floods but continuous support 
afterwards for a longer time to be able to restore their normal life 
activities.   
• There should be a treaty signed by all member states of the United Nations 
to share weather prediction and data regarding the onset of disaster in any 
part of the world so that if there is a prediction about the buildup of a 
disaster by any country that is shared with the victim country.  The victim 
country has information from all countries capable of weather or other 
natural disaster predictions and then it may decide on actions to be taken.  
In the case of the Pakistan floods, computer models at a European weather 
forecasting center, European Centre for Medium Range Weather 
Forecasting (ECMWF), were giving clear indications that the heavy 
downpours were imminent. If the information had been processed, heavy 
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rainfalls leading to the floods could have been predicted around 8 – 10 
days beforehand.187 If this was the case, a great number of lives lost in the 
initial phase of floods could have been spared and better preparations 
might have been done. 
• After the Haiti earthquake there emerged three different loosely connected 
communities of interest, which included the U.S. government, the United 
Nations and the international community and Information Communication 
Technologists (ICT) Volunteers. They all collected, shared and used great 
amounts of digital information through a variety of web portals, platforms 
and social networking media, such as Short Message Service (SMS) feeds, 
Twitter and Facebook. Each community has their priorities and 
requirements and therefore it should be worked out that critical data and 
information should be structured in such a way that it can be shared across 
communities, networks and platforms. The databases thus prepared and 
made available can serve all actors involved in the humanitarian 
operations to get help in their respective field.188 The governments should 
support the continued use of these databases and make their best use in the 
conducting relief and rehabilitation operations more effectively.  
• Essential baseline geospatial datasets should be stored, backed up and 
shared in advance so that they can be used immediately once a disaster 
occurs.  Likewise, geo referenced datasets that are collected during the 
immediate response/relief phase of a disaster should also be stored and 
maintained so that they can be used for planning and analysis during the 
subsequent reconstruction and recovery phases. 
• New ICT tools and information systems may be introduced to the public 
and relevant people involved in HA/DR operations may be trained in their 
use in advance of emergencies, so that these technologies can be utilized 
                                                 
187 Anthony Watts, “Pakistan floods last summer could have been predicted,” 1 February 2011. 
Accessed 5 May 2011. Available http://wattsupwiththat.com/2011/02/01/pakistan-floods-last-summer-
could-have-been-predicted/. 
188 King, “The Haiti earthquake: breaking new ground in the humanitarian information landscape.” 
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fully and effectively when a disaster occurs. Tools and technologies that 
are interoperable, nonproprietary, no/low cost, self contained, easy to 
access and easy to use are the most effective. 
• It may be ensured that critical data and information is preapproved for 
release and is sharable with the host government, civil society and affected 
population in local languages to strengthen host country capacities, 
leverage local expertise, gain their input, involve them in coordination and 
empower them. 
• In order to keep up with the latest technology innovations and new 
management practices, the international humanitarian community should 
engage with the private sector and academic institutions because they are 
increasingly donating funds, equipment and volunteers to humanitarian 
response efforts.  This should be done both systematically and 
continuously. 
• In earthquake prone regions strict earthquake safe building standards 
should be implemented and ensured.  This not only entails the use of 
stronger, more resilient building materials, but also the development of 
strong institutions that can enforce safe building standards.  The 
infrastructures may be made more redundant by making more roads, 
backup generators, water reservoirs, or fuel reserves and communications 
systems for emergency warnings with backup systems, etc., which are key 
in making civil services more robust to disasters.   
• For effective use of social media, it may be ensured that a redundant 
infrastructure is needed to support the internet after a disaster occurred in 
the country.  In the case of Pakistan’s floods most of the people had no 
chance to access the internet due to lack of necessary infrastructure in 
affected areas. And while generators were used to recharge mobiles in 
Haiti, a flood more than a meter high, such as in Pakistan, would have 
likely flooded all generators, making them useless even if the internet 
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service was available in the affected areas. 189  Therefore, it may be useful 
to widely distribute small portable solar powered nodes to small 
communities, which may be used to recharge a laptop and number of cell 
phones that may be used by the people to share their status with the 
relatives and make calls for any help needed to the concerned authorities 
or relief workers.  Governments may consider installing generators 1 – 2 
meters above the ground in flood prone areas so that these may be used to 
provide energy to essential resources such as lighting, or pumping 
drinking water, etc., in the event of floods.  
• Pakistan government should consider inviting and facilitating the 
international charity organizations to develop their setup in the country.   
These organizations may act as a bridge between the local public and the 
international community and are therefore very useful to establishing 
social contacts and project the true image of the nation worldwide as these 
generally operate globally.  These organizations are particularly very 
helpful in motivating the international public for donations and gathering 
help in case of any disaster happening in the country as they enjoy great 
support and trust by the people in most cases.  
C. PROPOSED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The HA/DR challenge is an ever existing phenomena.  It is only in the near past 
and the present, due to the world becoming a global village because of interconnecting 
communication tools, that it has been possible to have institutionalized technological 
preparation and response to disasters by the local and international community.  
Therefore, this is a topic that has a lot of dimensions to be explored to improve it and 
make it help humanity throughout the world. However, some of the areas that can be 
explored are: 
                                                 




• The proposed model organizational structure may be studied in depth for 
its viability and capability to resolve interagency coordination and 
functionality issues among different organizations and agencies involved 
in the HA/DR operations. 
• The role of social media may be studied for its effectiveness in the relief 
and rehabilitation efforts.  Efforts to understand how best to employ or use 
it in poor or developing countries in the aftermath of a major disaster 
should be undertaken. 
• Volunteer built technologies made a visible difference in Haiti relief and 
recovery efforts. Technologists who work outside humanitarian operations 
and volunteer their time could build applications that can help conduct the 
relief and recovery operation in a more coordinated and effective ways.  It 
should be worked out by humanitarian agencies to figure out how to make 
best use of them rather by government fiat. 
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